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I. THE CASE OF JOANN PARKS
On April 9, 1989, JoAnn Parks put her three children to sleep2
and went to bed.1 Around midnight, she awoke to their screams.
Her children were trapped on the other end of their house, and
the house was engulfed in flames. 3 The heat from the fire was so
intense that JoAnn could not get to her children, and was instead
forced out of the house where she ran to her neighbor's home for
4
help.
The neighbors called 911 and one neighbor tried to rescue the
When the fire
children, but the fire made it impossible. 5
was too late. 6
it
later,
minutes
ten
than
less
arrived
department
7
All three of JoAnn's children were dead.
Initial investigations concluded that the fire was caused by an
electrical malfunction. 8 Yet, two and a half years later, JoAnn
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1 Reporters' Transcript on Appeal at 1897, 2186-87, 2189, People v. Parks, No. VA 009503
(Cal. Ct. App. May 13, 1993).
2 Id. at 2188, 2189.
3 See id. at 2186-87, 2188.
1 Id. at 2188.
5 Id. at 1627, 1628.
6 See id. at 2239, 2249-50, 2256, 2257.
7 See id. at 2249-50, 2257.
8 Id. at 2393, 2825, 2953.
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was charged with three counts of murder. 9
At trial, the
prosecution argued that JoAnn had intentionally set fire to her
own house. 10 The prosecution pointed out that the neighbor who
tried to rescue the children and the responding officers smelled of
smoke and coughed for several days.1 1 On the other hand,
however, JoAnn's clothes had very little ash and did not smell
strongly of smoke. 12 JoAnn herself did not seem to exhibit any
physical issues caused by smoke inhalation.1 3 One neighbor
14
testified that JoAnn seemed dazed on the night of the fire.
Witnesses also testified that she was not hysterical, 15 as some
might expect a mother to respond, 16 although other witnesses
testified that she had been crying.17
Expert testimony presented by the prosecution indicated that
two fires had been set intentionally-one in the living room and
another in the southeast bedroom.1 8
Experts ruled out an
electrical source for the fire,1 9 and Ronald Parks himself-the
father of the victims and JoAnn's husband, who was at work at
the time of the fire 2 0-testified that there were no electrical
21
problems in the home.
In addition to the testimony about the fire's origin, a firefighter
testified that he found an unburned pattern in front of the closed
closet where Parks' son, Ronny, was found. 22 The firefighter
testified that the unburned area indicated that something had
been placed in front of the closed closet door to keep it from
swinging open. 23 Two investigators both agreed that a laundry
hamper had been placed in front of the closet door based on this
evidence.24
The defense's evidence demonstrated the fire could actually
have been caused by a defective TV known for its tendency to
9 Id. at 4, 5.
10 Id. at 1546, 1554.

11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.

at
at
at
at

15 Id.
16 Id.

at 2530.

1641-42, 1694-95.
1642.
2185.
1561.

17 Id. at 1888, 2185.

18 See id. at 2935, 2938-40, 3029.
19 Id. at 2443.
20 Id. at 1892, 1897, 1906, 1911.
21 Id. at 1948.
22 See id. at 2187, 2261.
23 Id. at 2261.
24 Id. at 2261, 3147.
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start fires. 25 Nevertheless, JoAnn Parks was convicted on all
26
charges and sentenced to three life terms without parole.
Over the past twenty-six years there have been dramatic new
scientific developments in the area of arson investigation. 27 New
evidence shows that the fire investigators in JoAnn's case based
their investigation on what are now debunked- arson myths and
the conviction was tainted by incorrect investigative theories. 28
For example, what we commonly understand to be a "flashover"
Had the
effect was not yet fully understood in 1989.29
the
prosecution's
investigators known about such a phenomenon,
theory that there were two points of origin to the fire would have
been disproven. In fact, there has been a great deal of new
30
research on fire origin that debunks the "greatest damage"
theory that was applied to this case. 31 New research makes clear
that multiple points of origin does not necessarily indicate arson
because fire can and often does jump, starting a new fire in the
spot it jumps to. 32 The standard method of determining origins of
fire in an electrical fire is now an "arc survey," 33 but this method
was not widely used or mentioned in the National Fire Protection
Association ("NFPA") 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion
34
Investigations ("NFPA 921").
This new evidence, combined with the evidence of the many
house fires caused by the same brand and model of TV owned by
the Parks, would likely have guaranteed an acquittal had it all

25 Id. at 3724.
2
27

Id. at 5984-86.
See Steve W. Carman, Improving the Understandingof Post-FlashoverFire Behavior,

2008 INT'L SYMP. ON FIRE INVESTIGATION SCI.& TECH. 221, 223, 225.

28 See Reporters' Transcript on Appeal, supra note 1, at 2509-10; John J. Lentini, The
Evolution Of Fire Investigation and Its Impact on Arson Cases, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2012, at
12, 15, 17.
29 Lentini, supra note 28, at 15, 17.
30 The assessment of the greatest damage is an investigative technique that searches for
the origin of the fire based on the spectrum of lesser to greater damage. See id. Current
investigative standards warn against this method to identify the origin of the fire. See id.
31 See Reporters' Transcript on Appeal, supranote 1, at 2509-10; Lentini, supra note 28, at
15, 17.
32 See Arc: Mapping: A Useful Tool for Discovering a Fire's Origin, INVESTIGATE FIRES
(Nov. 1, 2011), http://investigatefires.com/?p=214.
33 When a fire burns away the insulation on an electrically charged wiring, the electricity
may spark and jump across the surface or air. Id. This phenomenon is called "arcing." Arc
surveys, also known as "arc mapping," locate and document these arcs to help investigators
determine a fire's origins. Id.
34 NFPA 921 is a national manual of uniform guidelines for conducting fire and explosion

NAT'L FIRE PROT. ASS'N, NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION
investigations.
INVESTIGATIONS 921-6 (2004) [hereinafter NFPA 9211.
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been brought to light at the time of trial. However, in the world
of post-conviction, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
prove there is sufficient new evidence of innocence to justify the
35
reversal of the conviction.
California has the most difficult standard in the United States
for obtaining the reversal of a conviction based on new evidence
of innocence. In California, a conviction will only be reversed
based on new evidence when the new evidence completely
"undermine[s] the entire prosecution case and point[s] unerringly to
innocence or reduced culpability." 36 In addition, the convicted must
show that no "reasonable jury could have rejected" the new evidence
of innocence. 37 This is an incredibly high burden of proof.
This article surveys the new evidence standard in post-conviction
from around the country and explores the practical and legal
ramifications of these standards. The new evidence standard is
often what stands between an innocent inmate's prison cell and
freedom. The standards should provide a vehicle for the reversal of
convictions of the innocent, while not overburdening the system
with unjustifiable claims or allowing for the release of those who are
factually guilty. That is not the current state of the law across the
country. The authors, who have all spent their careers litigating
new evidence claims on behalf of innocent clients, conclude the
article with a suggested model for post-conviction new evidence
statutes.
II. CALIFORNIA'S NEW EVIDENCE STANDARD AND THE DIFFICULTY
FOR CASES SUCH AS JOANN PARKS'

Reaching the standard of completely undermining the
prosecution's case with evidence that points unerringly to innocence
in post-conviction is very difficult to attain. In cases such as JoAnn
Parks', where new science undermines the arson conclusions
determined at trial, there is a near that certainty the jury would not
have convicted in the face of the new evidence. However, under
California law the question still remains whether the evidence
completely undermines the prosecution's case and points unerringly

35 See People v. Duvall, 886 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Cal. 1995) (citing People v. Gonzalez, 800
P.2d 1159, 1205-06 (Cal. 1990)).
36 Gonzalez, 800 P.2d at 1196 (citing In re Hall, 637 P.2d 690, 697-98 (Cal. 1981); In re
Weber, 523 P.2d 229, 243 (Cal. 1974)).
37 In re Lawley, 179 P.3d 891, 898 (Cal. 2008) (quoting In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 761 n.33
(Cal. 1993)).
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to innocence. 38 In addition to the discredited arson evidence, the
case was built on evidence that JoAnn was at the house the night of
the fire, fled the house without her children, and her response to the
tragedy was not one the jurors found consistent with a grieving
mom. So, does new arson science combined with the evidence of
television fires completely -undermine the prosecution's case?- Does
all of the evidence presented by the prosecution need to be proven
false? Even if there is some evidence, should we not reverse a
conviction if that evidence would never be sufficient to convict?
And, what does "point unerringly to innocence" mean?
Unfortunately, both prongs mean different things to different
judges and often leave innocent people in prison.

III. A REVIEW OF NEW EVIDENCE STATUTES AND STANDARDS
ACROSS THE U.S.: FIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW TO ADDRESS NEW

EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AFTER CONVICTION
To some degree, any post-conviction proceedings reflect an
attempt to strike the appropriate balance between two conflicting
important concepts in the criminal justice system: finality and
accuracy.39 It is important for convictions to be final once they have
been entered so that the matter is fully resolved, the system can
move on to other matters, the victim can move on with his/her life,
and the convicted person can begin serving the penalty. 40 Of course,
it is also important that the conviction is accurate and the right
person has been convicted. Indeed, there is no value to society,
victims, or defendants in convicting innocent people. Therefore,
there needs to be some way to address those instances where the
criminal justice system has gotten it wrong, while also recognizing
that in most cases, the conviction is proper.
New evidence statutes like California's have admirable goals, as
they ostensibly provide some process for innocent people to obtain
relief in the event those innocent people find new information that
challenges the truth of their conviction. However, the kind of
process, and the method of determining whether relief should be
granted, is incredibly important. If the process is too difficult, or if
the standard is too high, then innocent people will be unable to
obtain relief. If it is too low, then convictions may be challenged too
3s See supra notes 36, 37 and accompanying text.
39 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 422-24 (1963).
40 JH Dingfelder Stone, Facing the Uncomfortable Truth: The Illogic of Post-Conviction
DNA Testing for Individuals Who Pleaded Guilty, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 47, 52 (2010).
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frequently for the courts to bear.
A. What Is New Evidence?
The term "new evidence," is deceptively simple. Is it any evidence
discovered after trial? What about evidence that could have been
discovered before the conviction, but was not? If it was discovered
shortly after the time of the conviction (and possibly before the
sentence), is this truly "new" evidence? Answers to these questions
are often counterintuitive in the post-conviction arena, and can be
41
different depending on the state in which the question is raised.
Often, new evidence that was not available to the defendant at
trial can be raised in claims other than new evidence. For instance,
new evidence can also qualify as:
1. Brady42 material.
Brady material is evidence that was
suppressed, whether willfully or inadvertently, by the prosecutor or
by law enforcement before, during, or after trial, and which is
material-that is, there is a reasonable probability of a different
43
result had the evidence been available at the time of trial.
Although the evidence is discovered after trial, it could have been
discovered before trial but for the prosecution's failure to turn over
the evidence. 44 Brady violations have their own remedies in law
45
and are not covered by the new evidence law.
2. Evidence that could have been discovered by an effective trial
attorney. If trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the case,
then the evidence the attorney failed to discover will allow for relief
if there is a reasonable probability that, but for those failures and
errors, the result would have been different. 46 Although the
evidence is discovered after trial, it could have been discovered
before trial but for counsel's unprofessional errors. 47 Therefore,
similar to Brady, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be

41 For example, California's definition of new evidence is particularly broad. See, e.g., In re
Branch, 449 P.2d 174, 183-84 (Cal. 1969) ("[]t is so fundamentally unfair for an innocent
person to be incarcerated that he should not be denied relief simply because of his failure at
trial to present exculpatory evidence. Thus, the term 'new evidence' . . . should be held to
include any evidence not presented to the trial court and which is not merely cumulative in
relation to evidence which was presented at trial.").
42 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
13 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
44 See, e.g., Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
45 David E. Singleton, Brady Violations: An In-Depth Look at "HigherStandard"Sanctions
For a High-StandardProfession, 15 WYO. L. REV. 139, 153 (2015).
46 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984).
47 See, e.g., Fraizer v. Huffman, 343 F.3d 780, 794-95 (6th Cir. 2003).
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brought under the Sixth Amendment, but not a new evidence
48
claim.
3. Evidence that is not new in and of itself, but is evidence that
some portion of the trial was false. If, after the trial, evidence
arises that shows a witness lied, or the results of a forensic test
were erroneous -or-some other- evidence- comes out that the trial
rested on an improper conclusion, then this may mean a reversal of
the conviction, not under a new evidence law, but instead under a
claim that the defendant did not receive a fair trial in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 49 In this
instance, although the evidence is discovered after trial (e.g., "I lied
in Jones's case when I identified him as the perpetrator"), the
evidence is usually analyzed in terms of whether, absent the prior
testimony introduced at trial, the court can have confidence in the
conviction.5 0 For example, in California, false evidence under state
law is grounds for reversal if there is a "reasonable probability" that
the result would have been different had the evidence never been
51
introduced in the first place.
4. Evidence that is not necessarily new, but is evidence of actual
innocence. An individual may be entitled to relief regardless of
whether new evidence or other evidence exists in his or her case,
provided he or she is actually innocent. Colloquially known as a
Herrera52 claim, or a freestanding actual innocence claim, the
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to decide
whether such relief even exists, holding instead that if such a right
existed, the* "threshold showing . . . would necessarily be
Despite this language-and the total
extraordinarily high."53
absence of claimants who have met this standard-many scholars
now believe actual innocence is a valid claim of relief, partially
because of the increasing number of state statutes recognizing the
54
claim.
Thus, there is quite a bit of overlap between these categories and
48

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92, 693-94.

49 See, e.g., White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945) (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.

103, 112-13 (1935)). Note that the Supreme Court has held that state inmhates seeking
federal relief are only entitled to such relief on false evidence claims if the prosecution knew
or should have known that the evidence was false. See Cash v. Maxwell, 132 S. Ct. 611, 615
(2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)).
50 See In re Richards, 289 P.3d 860, 869 (Cal. 2012).
51 Id.
(quoting In re Roberts, 60 P.3d 165, 174 (Cal. 2003)).
52 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
53 Id. at 417.
54 See, e.g., Paige Kaneb, Innocence Presumed: A New Analysis of Innocence as a
ConstitutionalClaim, 50 CAL. W. L. REV. 171, 175-76, 203-06 (2014).
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most post-conviction petitions contain a mix of one or more claims
for relief. Evidence that a witness was given a deal in exchange for
his or her testimony may mean the prosecution violated its
obligations under Brady, and it may also mean the witness testified
falsely against the defendant. 55 Recantation cases often contain
both false and new evidence claims-the false evidence was the
56
original testimony and the new evidence is the recantation.
However, there are also claims that rely solely on the
presentation of new evidence-evidence that simply could not have
been discovered until after trial. For example, a witness who saw
the entire crime from her window and never told anyone that
someone other than the person wrongfully convicted was the
perpetrator, may not have been discoverable by either the
prosecution or the defense prior to trial. Also, if he or she never
testified, then he or she never gave false testimony. The evidence in
such a case can then only be raised in a "newly discovered evidence
claim" as evidence that was discovered-and discoverable-only
57
after the conviction occurred.
The classic example of this type of distinction is found within the
relatively new science of DNA. Before the advent of forensic DNA
testing in the late 1980s, an individual could be convicted based in
part on testimony that blood found at the crime scene matched the
defendant's blood type. 58 Later DNA testing, which shows the blood
was, in fact, not a match to the defendant, does not make the prior
testimony false because there was a match to the defendant's blood
type, even though DNA testing can prove definitively it is not the
defendant's blood.5 9 The prosecutor was not unethical under Brady
for presenting the evidence and could not have been faulted for
failing to turn over DNA results that did not yet exist. Similarly,
the defense attorney was not ineffective for failing to perform DNA
testing when that tool was not available at the time of conviction.
In these instances, what should the courts do to resolve the case?
Unfortunately for state inmates, in the eyes of the federal courts,
the answer is "nothing." The United States Supreme Court has
55 See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 150-51, 154-55 (1972).
56 See, e.g., People v. Morillo, No. 7672/91, 2011 WL 7726359, at *12, *13 n.14 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Oct. 6, 2011).
57 See, e.g., Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1089 (Fla. 2008); Morillo, 2011 WL
7726359, at *12.
"I Unvalidated or Improper Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/unvalidated-or-improper-forensic-science
(last visited
May 30, 2016).
59 See id.
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recently reaffirmed 60 its prior decisions that the jurisdiction of the
federal courts is to decide whether the inmate's constitutional rights
were violated at his or her trial, and have not resolved whether new
evidence that goes only to innocence or guilt is a constitutional
claim.6 1 In other words, if an innocent person is convicted in a trial
that is conducted in accord with all of the firmly established
constitutional rights, there may or may not be a right to have the
The
conviction reversed based on new evidence of innocence.
constitution only requires fair trials, not ones that get the right
result. 62 The Supreme Court's decision to leave this question
unresolved has been further complicated by the passage of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), which
provides that federal courts may not grant relief for constitutional
claims that were denied on the merits by a state court unless the
denial was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or .

.

. resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented" to the state court. 63 Therefore, the narrow
limitations of AEDPA, coupled with the Supreme Court's failure to
hold that innocence is a freestanding constitutional claim, currently
preclude federal courts from reviewing the merits of freestanding
64
claims of innocence.
60 Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71-72, 73-75 (2009).
61 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) ("[G]iven a valid conviction, the criminal
defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty .... " (emphasis added)).
62 See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977).
63 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2014) ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.").
64 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Yates, No. CIV S-08-2165-JAM-TJB, 2010 WL 4628197, at *33 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 5, 2010) ("[Tro the extent Petitioner asserts a freestanding actual innocence claim,
he is not entitled to relief because . . . the United States Supreme Court has expressly left
open the question of whether a freestanding actual innocence claim based on newly
discovered evidence constitutes grounds for habeas relief in a non-capital case. In the
absence of Supreme Court authority establishing the cognizability of a freestanding actual
innocence claim on federal habeas review, the California Supreme Court's rejection of
petitioner's freestanding actual innocence claim could not be contrary to, or involve an
unreasonable application of, 'clearly established' Supreme Court authority."). See also Wright
v. Stegall, 247 F. App'x. 709, 711 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Since the Supreme Court has declined to
recognize a freestanding innocence claim in habeas corpus, outside the death-penalty context,
this court finds that petitioner's claim is not entitled to relief under available Supreme Court
precedent.").
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The authors note that many, if not most, of the state statutes and
case law surrounding and codifying relief based on new evidence
have come about as a direct result of the advent of DNA evidence,
and the hundreds of innocent individuals whose cases have been
reversed because DNA became available after their convictions.
But DNA is not the end of new evidence. There are many examples
of other types of new evidence that can prove innocence, including
undiscovered witnesses and changes in forensic science, or other
technology may make a prior conviction unsustainable. 65 Joann
Parks' conviction is but one concrete example.
Unfortunately, many of the changes to the criminal justice system
and proposed legislation dealing with new evidence focus in large
part on DNA test results. The statutes and case law of Arkansas, 66
Delaware, 67 Maine, 68 Mississippi, 69 Nebraska, 70 Nevada, 71 New

65 Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1076
(2014); John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts' Approaches to a
ConstitutionalRight of Actual Innocence: Is there a Need for a State ConstitutionalRight in
New York in the Aftermath of CPL § 440.10(1)(G-1)?, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1453, 1474 (2013).
66 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-201(a)(2) (2015) (allowing for post-conviction relief based
on new, scientific evidence if that evidence would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable
finder of fact would find the claimant guilty of the underlying offense); id. § 16-112-208(e)(3)
("[I]f the . . . (DNA) test results, when considered with all other evidence in the case
regardless of whether the evidence was introduced at trial, establish by compelling evidence
that a new trial would result in an acquittal.").
67 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(b) (2015) (allowing for post-conviction relief based on
DNA evidence that was not available during trial if it establishes actual innocence, and
setting the standard of "clear and convincing evidence" that the petitioner would not have
been convicted by a reasonable trier of fact).
68 ME. STAT. tit. 15, § 2138 (10)(c)(1) (2016) (requiring a court to grant a new trial where
DNA test results would make it probable that there would be a different outcome); see also
State v. Dechaine, 2015 ME 88, 37, 121 A.3d 76, 96 ("Maine's post-conviction review process
'provides a comprehensive and, except for direct appeals from a criminal judgment, exclusive
method of review of those criminal judgments and of post-sentencing proceedings occurring
during the course of sentences.' The DNA analysis statute affords a defendant a narrow
opportunity to prove actual innocence or otherwise obtain a new trial outside of the postconviction review process. It is, however, limited in scope by its own terms." (citation
omitted)).
69 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5(2)(a)(ii) (2015) (permitting a motion to vacate based on
favorable DNA results that demonstrate by "reasonable probability" there would have been
no conviction had the results been available at the time of the original prosecution, and
exempting claims based on DNA results from three-year statutes of limitation).
10 See State v. Buckman, 675 N.W.2d 372, 383 (Neb. 2004) ("[T]o warrant a new trial, ...
newly discovered exculpatory evidence obtained pursuant to the DNA Testing Act must be of
such a nature that if it had been offered and admitted at the former trial, it probably would
have produced a substantially different result."); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4123(2) (2015)
(permitting vacation of conviction, a setting aside of judgment, and release from custody when
DNA results conclusively establish innocence); id. § 29-4118(2) (declaring that DNA results
that do not establish innocence but have probative value may still permit defendants to bring
a motion for a new trial under section 29-2101).
71 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.09187(1) (2015) (allowing petitioner to bring a motion for a
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York, 72 Ohio, 73 Oregon, 74 Tennessee, 75 Texas, 76 Utah, 77 Vermont, 78
and Wyoming 79 provide for relief, or modify and expand the limited
available relief or the applicable standard, only if the claim of new
evidence is based on the results of DNA testing.

new trial based on newly discovered evidence pursuant to section 176.515, notwithstanding
time limitations, if DNA or genetic testing favors the petitioner); see also id. § 176.515(3)
("Except as otherwise provided in NRS 176.09187, a motion for a new trial based on the
ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only within two years after the verdict or
finding of guilt.").
72 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(g-1)(2) (McKinney 2015) ("At any time after the
entry of a judgment, the court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant,
vacate such judgment upon the ground that [f]orensic DNA testing of evidence [has been]
performed since the entry of a judgment, [and] that there exists a reasonable probability that
the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant.").
73 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.21(A)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2015) (providing appropriate
relief if petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence, that the DNA testing results,
analyzed in the context of all other admissible evidence, establish actual innocence of the
offense); id. § 2953.21(A)(1)(b) ("'[A]ctual innocence' means that, had the results of the DNA
testing . . . been presented at trial, . . . no reasonable factfinder would have found the

petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted .. ").
74 See OR. REV. STAT. § 138.696 (2015) ("If DNA testing... produces exculpatory evidence,
the person who requested the testing may file in the court that ordered the testing a motion
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Notwithstanding the time limit
established in ORCP 64 F, a person may file a motion under this subsection at any time
during the 60-day period that begins on the date the person receives the test results.").
75 See Mills v. State, No. M2011-00620-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 996, at
*17, *55, *62, *70, *71 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2013) (describing how in a petition for writ
of error coram nobis based on DNA test results, relief was given based on new DNA evidence
that did not meet actual innocence standards, but met coram nobis standards). The Mills
court held "that had the new DNA evidence been presented at trial, the result of the
proceedings on all of the charges might have been different." Id. at *70 (citing State v.
Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 527 (Tenn. 2007)).
76 See Frank v. State, 190 S.W.3d 136, 138 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) ("[O]n application of law to
fact [the court must] ascertain whether a defendant has shown, by a preponderance of the
evidence, 'that, had the results of the DNA test been available at trial, there is a 51% chance
that the defendant would not have been convicted."' (quoting Smith v. State, 165 S.W.3d 361,
364 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005))); but see Exparte Holloway, 413 S.W.3d 95, 97 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013) ("[A]n applicant can establish that it is 'probable' that the verdict would be different on
retrial only if he can 'show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would
have convicted him in light of the new evidence."' (quoting Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202,
209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996))).
77 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-303(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2015) (providing the standard for
vacating convictions based on DNA testing); id. §§ 78B-9-404(1)(b), (4) (stating that for nonDNA innocence claims, to vacate a conviction with prejudice and expunge a record, a court
must find that the petitioner has met a clear and convincing standard of evidence to establish
that he or she is factually innocent).
78 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5561(a) (2015) (providing that, contrary to the two-year time
limitation detailed in VT. R. CRIM. P. 33, DNA claims for most cases can be brought at any
time (see VT. R. CRIM. P. 33)). In Vermont, with a showing of a "reasonable probability . ..
that the petitioner would not have been convicted," the court can grant a new trial or provide
any relief it deems appropriate. tit. 13, §§ 5566(a)(1), 5569(c).
79 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-303(b) (2015) (providing that, contrary to the two-year time
limitation detailed in Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 33, a convicted person may use DNA test results as
the basis for a motion for new trial (see WYO. R. CRIM. P. 33(c))).
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It falls to state legislatures and state courts to determine how
new evidence claims should be considered in their own state courts,
and because federal relief is not currently available,8 0 it is all the
more incumbent upon those state legislatures to craft an effective
and workable process for obtaining relief when new evidence is
available in a case. An analysis of various state approaches to this
problem follows, but a working definition of what is "new evidence"
is fairly simple: new evidence is evidence discovered after a
defendant's conviction that could not have been discovered before the
conviction. This definition provides some clarity to the term and
presents a framework upon which the central issues of new
evidence may be built.
B. What Should the StandardBe for a Successful Claim?
This is perhaps the most important question for states to answer
when considering how to draft or revise any legislation providing for
relief based on a claim of new evidence.
There are varying
approaches to this standard.
1. "Reasonable Probability of a Different Result"
Under this standard, new evidence entitles an inmate to relief if
there is a reasonable probability of a different result in light of the
new evidence. This is most closely analogous to other forms of relief
in the post-conviction arena, such as ineffective assistance of
counsel,8 1 Brady violations,8 2 or (in the case of California) false
evidence.8 3 Only one state, Wisconsin,8 4 provides for relief based on
this standard for all kinds of newly discovered evidence (and not
only newly discovered DNA evidence). However, it is worth noting
that Wisconsin's procedural limitations on newly discovered
evidence, such as that the evidence must have been discovered after
trial and that the defendant was not negligent in seeking the

Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55-56, 73-74, 74 n.4 (2009).
81 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
82 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
83 In re Richards, 289 P.3d 860, 869 (Cal. 2012) (citing In re Roberts, 60 P.3d 165, 174 (Cal.
50

2003)).
84 See State v. Plude, 2008 WI 58,
32, 310 Wis. 2d 28, 48, 750 N.W.2d 42, 52 ("If the
defendant is able to prove all four . . . criteria [including that new material evidence exists],
then it must be determined whether a reasonable probability exists that had the jury heard
the newly-discovered evidence, it would have had a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's
guilt." (citing State v. McCallum, 561 N.W.2d 707, 710-11 (Wis. 1997))).
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evidence, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.8 5
At least four other states-New York,8 6 Mississippi,8 7 Utah,88 and
Vermont 8 9-utilize the reasonable probability of a different outcome
standard, but only for newly discovered DNA evidence and, as noted
previously, employ more rigorous standards when the request for
relief based -on-newly d-iscovered evidence is not based on DNA. 90
Most likely, the fact that so few states take this approach when
considering how new evidence should be considered is likely
because, unlike other methods of post-conviction relief, pure new
evidence claims do not necessarily contemplate a constitutional
violation at trial or an unfair trial. 91 In other words, the defendant
is not complaining that the trial or its outcome was unfair based on
the evidence presented (or not presented), the way it was presented,
or the reasons why he or she was unable to present relevant
evidence. When such constitutional violations occur, the state's
interest in the finality of convictions is lower, because the trial has
been tainted in some way. 92 As a result, the standard for relief
should be low. In new evidence claims, the defendant is asking for
another bite at the apple based on something altogether new, and
not because the first bite of the apple was rotten. Because of this,
the state's interest in the finality of convictions is higher, and
arguably, the defendant should therefore meet some higher
standard for relief.

85 See State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119,
158, 159, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 702-03, 700 N.W.2d
98, 130 (holding that the preliminary requirements in a claim for relief based on newly
discovered evidence are as follows: (1) the evidence was discovered after conviction; (2) the
defendant was not negligent in seeking evidence; (3) the evidence is material to an issue in
the case; and (4) the evidence is not merely cumulative; and the court must then determine
whether a reasonable probability exists that a different result would be reached in a trial
(quoting State v. Avery, 570 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997))).
86 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(g-1)(2) (McKinney 2015) ("[Alfter the entry of a
judgment, the court ... may... vacate such judgment upon the ground that.., there exists a
reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant.").
87 MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5(1)(f) (2015) (permitting motion to vacate based on favorable
DNA results that show with "reasonable probability" that had results been available at the
time of the original prosecution, the outcome would have been different).
88 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-104(2) (LexisNexis 2015) (stating that to obtain a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence, the petitioner must show a "reasonable likelihood" that
they would have been found not guilty, or less culpable).
89 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5566(a)(1) (2015) ("The court shall grant the petition ... if...
[a] reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have been convicted or would
have received a lesser sentence for the crime which the petitioner claims to be innocent of...
."1).

9o See supra notes 69, 72, 77-78 and accompanying text.
91 See Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55-56 (2009).
92 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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2. Would "Probably" or "More Likely Than Not" Change the Result?
A majority of jurisdictions-twenty-nine states 93 and the District
93 ALABAMA: ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(e)(4) ("[A]ny defendant who has been convicted of a
criminal offense may [be granted] . . . appropriate relief on the ground that . . . [n]ewly

discovered material facts exist which require that the conviction or sentence be vacated by
the court, because .. . [i]f the facts had been known at the time of trial or of sentencing, the
result probably would have been different .... ");ARIZONA: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134231(5) (2015) ("[A]ny person who has been convicted of or sentenced for a criminal offense
may ...

institute a proceeding to secure appropriate relief [if] . . . [n]ewly discovered material

facts probably exist and [those] facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence.");
COLORADO: Farrar v. People, 208 P.3d 702, 707 (Colo. 2009) ("[N]ewly discovered evidence ..
•must be such that it would probably produce an acquittal." (citing Digiallonardo v. People,
488 P.2d 1109, 1113 (Colo. 1971))); DELAWARE: Swan v. State, 28 A.3d 362, 387 (Del. 2011)
("To obtain a new trial ... [the defendant] must show . . . that newly discovered evidence

would have probably changed the result if presented to the jury .... (citing Lloyd v. State,
534 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Del. 1987))); but see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(b) (2015) ("[A]
person convicted of a crime who claims that DNA evidence not available at trial establishes
the petitioner's actual innocence may commence a proceeding to secure relief by filing a
motion for a new trial in the court that entered the judgment of conviction. The court may
grant a new trial if the person establishes by clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable trier of fact ... would have convicted the person."); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 33
(stating that to qualify for this standard, a motion for new trial must be made prior to or
within two years of final judgment); FLORIDA: Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991)
("[N]ewly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an
acquittal on retrial."); GEORGIA: Delguidice v. State, 707 S.E.2d 603, 609 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)
("[N]ewly discovered evidence [must be] ... so material that it would probably produce a
different verdict ......(quoting Timberlake v. State, 271 S.E.2d 792, 795 (Ga. 1980)));
HAWAII: HAW. R. PENAL P. 40; State v. Mabuti, 807 P.2d 1264, 1268 (Haw. 1991) ("[T]he
[newly discovered] evidence [must be] of such a nature as would probably change the result of
a later trial." (quoting State v. McNulty, 588 P.2d 438, 445 (Haw. 1978))); IDAHO: State v.
Drapeau, 551 P.2d 972, 978 (Idaho 1976) (holding that a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence is only justified where, among other requirements, the evidence will probably result
in an acquittal); see also Small v. State, 971 P.2d 1151, 1158 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998) (holding
that the standards set forth in Drapeau apply to post-conviction claims); ILLINOIS: People v.
Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941, 949-50 (Ill. 2009) ("[P]ostconviction petitioners [have] the right to
assert a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence [if] ...
[the] 'conclusive character ... [of the evidence] would probably change the result on retrial."'
(quoting People v. Morgan, 817 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ill. 2004))); INDIANA: Kubsch v. State, 934
N.E.2d 1138, 1145 (Ind. 2010) ("[N]ew evidence will mandate a new trial only when the
defendant demonstrates that ...

the evidence . . .will probably produce a different result at

retrial." (first alteration in original) (quoting Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 329-30 (Ind.
2006))); IOWA: Summage v. State, 579 N.W.2d 821, 822 (Iowa 1998) ("The applicant must
show . . . [newly discovered evidence] would probably change the result if a new trial was
granted." (citing Jones v. Scurr, 316 N.W.2d 905, 907 (Iowa 1982))); KENTUCKY: Foley v.
Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Ky. 2014) ("[I]n order for newly discovered evidence to
support a motion for new trial it must be 'of such decisive value or force that it would, with
reasonable certainty, have changed the verdict or that it would probably change the result if a
new trial should be granted."' (quoting Jennings v. Commonwealth, 380 S.W.2d 284, 285-86
(Ky. Ct. App. 1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); MICHIGAN: People v. Rao, 815
N.W.2d 105, 110-11 (Mich. 2012) ("For a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly
discovered evidence, a defendant must show that . . .the new evidence makes a different
result probable on retrial." (quoting People v. Cress, 664 N.W.2d 174, 182 (Mich. 2003)));
MISSISSIPPI: Massey v. State, 131 So. 3d 1213, 1218 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) ("In order to
warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must
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appear that the evidence will probably change the result if a new trial is granted." (quoting
Witherspoon v. State, 767 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000))); NEBRASKA: State v. ElTabech, 696 N.W.2d 445, 451 (Neb. 2005) ('The proper standard for reviewing motions for
new trial ... based upon newly discovered evidence ... is [that the evidence must be] of such
a nature that if it had been offered and admitted at the trial, it probably would have produced
a substantially different result." (citing State v. Buckman, 675 N.W.2d 372, 383 (Neb. 2004)));
NEVADA: Sanborn v. State, 812 P.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Nev. 1991) ("To establish a basis for a
new trial .. .the evidence must be: newly discovered; . . . [and] noncumulative; such as to
(quoting McLemore v. State, 577 P.2d
(..."
render a different result probable upon retrial .
871, 872 (Nev. 1978))); NEW HAMPSHIRE: State v. Etienne, 35 A.3d 523, 554 (N.H. 2011) ("To
prevail on a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, the defendant must
prove . . .that the evidence is of such a character that a different result will probably be
reached upon another trial." (quoting State v. Cossette, 856 A.2d 732, 737 (N.H. 2004))); NEW
JERSEY: State v. Nash, 58 A.3d 705, 723 (N.J. 2013) ("Evidence is newly discovered and
sufficient to warrant the grant of a new trial when it is . . .of the sort that would probably
change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted." (quoting State v. Carter 426 A.2d 501,
507-08 (N.J. 1981))); NEW MEXICO: State v. Garcia, 2005-NMSC-038, 8, 138 N.M. 659, 661,
125 P.3d 638, 640 (holding that pursuant to the applicable state statute, motions for a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence filed within two years of conviction is grounds for
relief if the new evidence "will probably change the result" of a conviction (quoting State v.
7, 102 N.M. 383, 384-85, 696 P.2d 471, 472-73)); but see
Volpato, 1985-NMSC-1017,
Montoya v. Ulibarri, 2007-NMSC-035, 28, 142 N.M. 89, 99, 163 P.3d 476, 486 (holding that
a petitioner asserting a claim of innocence must show by clear and convincing evidence that
no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence (citing State ex rel.
Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Mo. 2003))); infra notes 193-94 and accompanying
text; NEW YORK: People v. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97, 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (holding
that to win a new trial, defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
newly discovered evidence "will probably change the result" of the conviction (quoting People
v. Marino, 951 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012))); NORTH CAROLINA: State v.
Peterson, 744 S.E.2d 153, 158 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that on a post-conviction claim, to
succeed on a claim for relief based on newly discovered evidence, the petitioner must show
that, inter alia, the new evidence is of such nature that a different result will probably be
reached in a new trial (citing State v. Hall, 669 S.E.2d 30, 35 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)));
15, 826 P.2d 615, 617-18 (holding that in a
OKLAHOMA: Smith v. State, 1992 OK CR 3,
claim based on newly discovered evidence, the petitioner must prove that the new evidence
probably would have changed the verdict if it was presented at trial (citing Green v. State,
12, 713 P.2d 1032, 1037)); OREGON: State v. Acree, 134 P.3d 1069, 1071
1985 OK CR 126,
(Or. Ct. App. 2006) ("[Newly discovered evidence] must be such as will probably change the
(quoting State v. Arnold, 879 P.2d 1272, 1276 (Or.
...
result if a new trial is granted.
1994))); PENNSYLVANIA: 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(2)(vi) (2015) ("To be eligible for relief..
. the petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence . . . [t]hat the
conviction or sentence resulted from ...[t]he unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory
evidence that has subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome of the
trial if it had been introduced."); RHODE ISLAND: Reise v. State, 913 A.2d 1052, 1056 (R.I.
2007) ("[T]he [newly discovered] evidence [must be] of a kind which would probably change
the verdict at trial." (citing Bleau v. Wall, 808 A.2d 637, 642 (R.I. 2002))); SOUTH CAROLINA:
Clark v. State, 434 S.E.2d 266, 267 (S.C. 1993) ("To obtain a new trial based on after
discovered evidence, the party must show that the evidence .. .would probably change the
result if a new trial is had .... (citing Hayden v. State, 299 S.E.2d 854, 855 (S.C. 1983)));
13, 190 Vt. 81, 85, 25 A.3d 553, 557 ("To
VERMONT: State v. Charbonneau, 2011 VT 57,
succeed on a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant
must show: that 'the evidence is such as will probably change the result if a new trial is
granted ....' (quoting State v. Charbonneau, 2009 VT 86, 14, 186 Vt. 583, 586, 980 A.2d
279, 284)); WASHINGTON: State v. Wheeler, 349 P.3d 820, 825 (Wash. 2015) (en banc) (holding
that a claim for newly discovered evidence entitles individuals to relief if they can show,
among other requirements, the evidence "will probably change the result of the trial."
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of Columbia 9 4-have some variation of this standard, either by
statute or by case law.
The benefit of this standard is twofold: first, it is higher than
those standards found in other claims for post-conviction relief (e.g.,
ineffective assistance of counsel, Brady, and violations of Due
Process, such as the introduction of false evidence), reflecting that
individuals who have received a fair trial must provide some
additional showing for relief.95 That is, this standard establishes
that, although these individuals would not have been convicted had
this new evidence been available at the time of their trial, their trial
was not tainted or constitutionally defective, and so the finality of
court processes are preserved, without sacrificing the ability to
challenge the accuracy of those processes. Second, this standard is
not so high that innocent individuals are forced to establish their
innocence to an unachievable degree. In other words, this standard
appears to strike an appropriate and comfortable balance between
competing interests in the criminal justice system, and because of
this, it is hardly surprising that an overwhelming number of
jurisdictions have adopted it.
3. "Clear and Convincing Evidence" the Result Would be or Would
Have Been Different and "Clear and Convincing Evidence" the
Defendant is Innocent or Not Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
The statutes and case law of thirteen other states-Alaska, 96
Arkansas, 97 Connecticut, 98 Delaware,9 9 Louisiana, 100 Minnesota, 101

(quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Lord, 868 P.2d 835, 851 (Wash. 1994) (en banc))); WYOMING:
Keene v. State, 835 P.2d 341, 344 (Wyo. 1992) ("[I]n order to gain a new trial upon newly
discovered evidence . . . it [must be] so material that it would probably produce a different
verdict, if the new trial were granted .
(quoting Opie v. State, 422 P.2d 84, 85 (Wyo.
1967))).
94 Bouknight v. United States, 867 A.2d 245, 255 (D.C. 2005) ("[A] new trial based on
newly-discovered evidence . . . [requires the new evidence be] of such nature that in a new
trial it would probably produce an acquittal." (quoting Payne v. United States, 697 A.2d 1229,
1234 (D.C. 1997))).
95 Compare United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (using the "reasonable
probability" test for Brady material), with Bouknight, 867 A.2d at 255 (requiring that newly
discovered evidence show the probability of producing an acquittal before a new trial will be
granted).
96 ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.020(b)(2)(D)
(2014) ("[A] court may hear a claim based on newly
discovered evidence if the applicant ... establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the
applicant is innocent.").
97 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-201(a)(2) (2005) ("[T]o secure relief . . . [t]he scientific
predicate for the claim [must] . . . be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that no reasonable fact-finder would find the petitioner guilty of the underlying offense.").
98 Boles v. Comm'r of Corr., 874 A.2d 820, 823 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (requiring that in new
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Missouri,102 Montana, 10 3 New Mexico, 10 4 South Dakota,10 5
require the
Tennessee,10 6 Texas, 10 7 and Virginia 1 0 -essentially
evidence cases, the petitioner must show actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence
and that no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty (citing Player v. Comm'r of
Corr., 808 A.2d 1140, 1142-43 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002))).
99 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(b) (2014) ("[A] person convicted of a crime who claims
that DNA evidence not available at trial establishes the petitioner's actual innocence may
commence a proceeding to secure relief . . . [which] may [be] grant[ed] if the person
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable trier of fact . . .would have
convicted the person."); but see Swan v. State, 28 A.3d 362, 387 (Del. 2011).
100 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 930.3(7) (2016) ("The results of DNA testing performed
pursuant to an application granted under Article 926.1 [must] proven by clear and convincing
evidence that the petitioner is factually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.").
101 MINN. STAT. § 590.01(4)(b)(2) (2005) ("[A] court may hear a petition for postconviction
relief [based on] ...newly discovered evidence ...[that] establishes by a clear and convincing
standard that the petitioner is innocent of the offense or offenses for which the petitioner was
convicted.").
102 State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) ("The
appropriate burden of proof for a habeas claim based upon a freestanding claim of actual
innocence should ... require the petitioner to make a clear and convincing showing of actual
innocence that undermines confidence in the correctness of the judgment." (citing Ex parte
Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996))).
103 State v. Beach, 2013 MT 130, T 13, 370 Mont. 163, 168, 302 P.3d 47, 53 ("[Defendant]
must show by clear and convincing evidence that ... no reasonable juror would have found
him guilty of the offense in order for him to prevail on his substantive innocence claim."
44, 353 Mont. 411,
(second alteration in original) (quoting Beach v. State, 2009 MT 398,
421, 168, 220 P.3d 667, 673)).
104 Montoya v. Ulibarri, 2007-NMSC-035, 77 28, 29, 142 N.M. 89, 98-99, 163 P.3d 476,
485-86 (stating that a petitioner asserting a freestanding claim of innocence must convince
the court by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted him
in light of the new evidence); but see State v. Garcia, 2005-NMSC-038, 7 8, 138 N.M. 659, 661,
125 P.3d 638, 640 ("A motion for a new trial on grounds of newly-discovered evidence will not
be granted unless . . . 'it will probably change the result if a new trial is granted.
7, 102 N.M. 383, 384, 696 P.2d 471, 472)).
(quoting State v. Volpato, 1985-NMSC-017,
105Engesser v. Young, 856 N.W.2d 471, 481 (S.D. 2014) ("[T]he Legislature gave a habeas
court the authority to consider the merits of successive petitions for a writ of habeas corpus if
the petitioner brought forth newly discovered evidence that, if proven and considered in light
of the other evidence, clearly and convincingly established that no reasonable fact finder
would have found the petitioner guilty of the underlying offense.").
106 Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 290 (Tenn. 2009) (holding that Tennessee's PostConviction Procedure Act provides for freestanding claims of actual innocence based on
scientific evidence); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-110(f) (2015) (noting that postconviction petitioners must prove facts by clear and convincing evidence); but see Mills v.
State, No. M2011-00620-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 996, at *54-55, *69, *70
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2013) (holding that in a petition for writ of coram nobis based on DNA test
results, relief was given based on new DNA evidence that did not meet actual innocence
standards, but met coram nobis standards, based on the reasoning that if the new evidence
was presented during the trial, the result could have been different (citing State v. Vasquez,
221 S.W.3d 514, 527 (Tenn. 2007))).
107 Ex parte Thompson, 153 S.W.3d 416, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ("To merit relief, the
applicant bears the burden of showing that the newly discovered evidence unquestionably
establishes his or her innocence .... [T]he reviewing court must believe that no rational juror
would have convicted the applicant in light of the newly discovered evidence." (emphasis
added) (citing Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 209)); but see Ex parte Holloway, 413 S.W.3d 95, 97
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ("In the context of a free-standing claim of actual innocence, an
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defendant establish his or her innocence by clear and convincing
evidence before providing for relief. However, at least one of these
states, Connecticut, 109 uses the lower "probably" or "more likely
than not" standard for newly discovered DNA evidence.
The clear and convincing evidence standard can be problematic,
especially for states that require clear and convincing evidence of
innocence as opposed to states that require clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable fact-finder, jury, or juror would have
convicted in light of the new evidence. 110 For example, Arkansas,
Delaware, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, Texas, and
Virginia utilize some form of the latter standard, while Alaska,
Connecticut, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, and Tennessee use
the former.11
The authors believe the clear and convincing evidence standard is
too high, but especially in states that require clear and convincing
evidence of innocence. Requiring affirmative evidence of innocence
prohibits courts from granting new trials in cases where the newly
discovered evidence has completely eliminated all evidence of guilt.
Despite the fact that the inmate can thus show that he or she never
would have been convicted in the first place, he or she may remain
in prison, or even be executed, despite the complete lack of reliable
applicant can establish that it is 'probable' that the verdict would be different on retrial only
if he can 'show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him in light of the new evidence."' (emphasis added) (quoting Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d
at 209)); Frank v. State, 190 S.W.3d 136, 138 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) ("The Court of Criminal
Appeals has determined that de novo review is appropriate for appeals arising under article
64.03 because appellate review does not depend on determinations of demeanor or credibility,
but on application of law to fact to ascertain whether a defendant has shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, 'that, had the results of the DNA test been available at trial,
there is a 51% chance that the defendant would not have been convicted."' (quoting Smith v.
State, 165 S.W.3d 361, 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005))).
108 Turner v. Commonwealth, 694 S.E.2d 251, 264 (Va. Ct. App. 2010) ("[The petitioner]
must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that based on all of the evidence in the
record, 'no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."'
(emphasis omitted)).
1o9 See Thomas v. State, 24 A.3d 12, 25 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) ("A petitioner must persuade
the court that the new trial evidence . . . will probably, not merely possibly, result in a
different verdict at a new trial .... (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. State, 24 A.3d
630, 655-56 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011))); cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-582 (2015) (stating that such
petitions must be brought within three years of judgment unless based on DNA evidence).
See also Gould v. Comm'r of Corr., 22 A.3d 1196, 1205 (Conn. 2011) ("[T]he legislature had
determined that petitions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence generally
can only be brought within three years of the rendition of judgment ....
").
1O Compare Dellinger, 279 S.W.3d at 285 (allowing petitioner's freestanding claim of
actual innocence under clear and convincing evidence standard), with Holloway, 413 S.W.3d
at 98 (denying relief after finding the petitioner had failed to satisfy by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted in light of the new evidence).
"I See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
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evidence of guilt, simply because the State requires proof of
innocence as opposed to only a showing that no reasonable jury
would have convicted. These standards also raise other potential
injustices.
For example, in many rape cases, where DNA testing later shows
that sperm found in the victim did not come from the man convicted
of the crime, prosecutors will argue that the DNA must have come
from a consensual lover, or from another perpetrator committing
the crime with the defendant-even when the theory at trial was
that there was only one attacker.112 Under the "clear and convincing
evidence of innocence" standard, however, such a scenario may well
13
prevent courts from concluding the conviction should be reversed.
Finally, requiring affirmative evidence of innocence ignores the
reality upon which our criminal justice system was built: even the
most innocent person cannot always prove innocence, which is why
it is the state's obligation to prove guilt. 114 Post-conviction, proof of
innocence becomes even more rare. Many exonerations take place
fifteen to twenty years after the crime occurred; at that time, it is
nearly impossible to establish a solid alibi so the only way to
affirmatively prove innocence is to prove that some other particular
person committed the crime.11 5 If the police were unable to do so,
why should an imprisoned person or their lawyer, often working pro
bono, be expected to do so?
4. Miscellaneous Standards Across the Country
Other states have taken a much more individualized approach to
the new evidence standard; many are discussed below.
As noted at the beginning of this article, California has arguably
the highest standard in the country, only providing for relief when
the inmate can establish that the newly discovered evidence
112 This theory is so prevalent in the realm of post-conviction DNA testing that "the
unindicted co-ejaculator" theory is used as a shorthand for situations when the prosecution
simply refuses to concede in spite of the overwhelming evidence of innocence. See, e.g.,
Andrew Martin, The Prosecution's Case Against DNA, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 25, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/magazine/dna-evidence-lake-county.html?r=0.
113 See, e.g., Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (stating that
the applicable standard is "extraordinarily high" (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315
(1995))).
114 See, e.g., Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973) ("The Court of Appeals in this
case stated that the effect of the instruction was to place the burden on respondent to prove
his innocence. But the trial court gave, not once but twice, explicit instructions affirming the
presumption of innocence and declaring the obligation of the State to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.").
115 See, e.g., Kaneb, supra note 54, at 174.
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"undermine[s] the entire prosecution case," 116 and "point[s]
'117
unerringly to [his] innocence.
Maine's standard represents a hybrid of some of the language in
other standards. It allows for relief if the inmate can show "by clear
and convincing evidence" that DNA results "make it probable that a
different verdict would result upon a new trial."1 18 However, as
noted previously, Maine has held that an individual is not entitled
to relief based on new evidence unless the new evidence is DNA. 11 9
Maryland's standard provides for relief when the newly
discovered evidence "creates a substantial or significant possibility
that the result would have been different," 120 but confusingly, only
in claims for a petition for writs of actual innocence, which is
necessarily a much higher standard. 12 1 In addition, Maryland's case
law articulates that the "substantial or significant possibility" falls
somewhere below "beyond a reasonable doubt" but above reasonable
122
probability.
Massachusetts provides for relief based on newly discovered
evidence if a judge determines that "there is a substantial risk that
the jury would have reached a different conclusion" had the new
123
evidence been available at the time of trial.
Ohio allows for the granting of relief based on newly discovered
evidence if the evidence "discloses a strong probability that it will
116 See People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1196 (Cal. 1990) (citing In re Hall, 637 P.2d 690,
694 (Cal. 1981)).
117 See In re Johnson, 957 P.2d 299, 307 (Cal. 1998) (quoting Hall, 637 P.2d at 697).
"-s ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2138(10)(C)(1) (2015) (providing that the petitioner has
the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that DNA test results "make it
probable" that there would be a different verdict if a new trial is granted); see also State v.
Twardus, 2013 ME 74, 20, 72 A.3d 523, 531-32 ("[A] defendant seeking a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence must establish by clear and convincing evidence that . . . 'the
evidence is such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted .
(quoting
State v. Cookson, 2003 ME 136, 29, 837 A.2d 101, 110)).
119State v. Dechaine, 2015 ME 88, 39, 121 A.3d 76, 96.
120MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-301(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2015) ("A person [may] ...file a
petition for writ of actual innocence .. .if the person claims that there is newly discovered
evidence that . . . creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been
different, as that standard has been judicially determined.").
121 See id.
122 See Yonga v. State, 108 A.3d 448, 461 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) ("We favor,
however, a standard that falls between 'probable,' which is less demanding than 'beyond a
reasonable doubt,' and 'might' which is less stringent than probable. We think that a
workable standard is: [tlhe newly discovered evidence may well have produced a different
result, that is, there was a substantial or significant possibility that the verdict of the trier of
fact would have been affected." (quoting Yorke v. State, 556 A.2d 230, 234-35 (Md. 1989))).
123 Commonwealth v. Weichell, 847 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Mass. 2006) ("[T]he judge must
find there is a substantial risk that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had
the evidence been admitted at trial." (quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 491 N.E.2d 246, 248
(Mass. 1986))).
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change the result if a new trial is granted." 124
A small minority of states-Kansas, 125 North Dakota, 126 and West
Virginia 2 7-provide for relief if the inmate can show the evidence
"would likely" or "ought to" produce a different result. This is a very
slightly higher standard than standards that require the inmate
establish the- evidence 'would -more likely-than not" change -the
result, although in practice it may be a distinction without a
difference.
These unique approaches to the standard for new evidence reflect,
more often than not, the particular language found in prior cases in
those particular states.
5. States with Different Standards for Different Forms of Relief
One interesting approach employed by at least three states is to
have different standards available for different forms of relief. In
most states, when a court grants a newly discovered evidence claim,
the inmate gains a new trial.128 This makes sense with some
standards and burdens of proof, but does it make sense if one has
proven that one is innocent with clear and convincing evidence?
Certainly in California, where one must point unerringly to
innocence with evidence no reasonable jury could reject, 129 it makes
little to no sense to retry such a person.
The authors have identified two states and the District of
Columbia that provide for dismissal of charges with prejudice
43 (2d Dist.) (quoting State v.
124 State v. Gillispie, 2012-Ohio-2942, 985 N.E.2d 145,
Petro, 76 N.E.2d 370, 370 (Ohio 1947)); but see OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.21(A)(1)(a)
(LexisNexis 2015) (stating that in a motion to vacate or set aside a conviction based on DNA
testing results, relief is appropriate if the petitioner can show by "clear and convincing
evidence" that the DNA testing results, analyzed in the context of all other admissible
evidence, establish actual innocence of the offense); id. § 2953.21(A)(1)(b) ('[Alctual innocence
means .. .no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of
which the petitioner was convicted ....").
125 State v. Cook, 135 P.3d 1147, 1166 (Kan. 2006) ('The test for determining whether a
new trial is warranted on the ground of newly discovered evidence ....[depends on] whether
the evidence is of such materiality that it would be likely to produce a different result upon
retrial." (citing State v. Norton, 85 P.3d 686, 690 (Kan. 2004))).
16, 779 N.W.2d 667, 675 ("To prevail on a motion for
126 Tweed v. State, 2010 ND 38,
new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence . . . 'the defendant must show ... [that]
the weight and quality of the newly discovered evidence would likely result in an acquittal."'
(quoting Moore v. State, 2007 ND 96, 9, 734 N.W.2d 336, 339)).
127 State ex rel. Smith v. McBride, 681 S.E.2d 81, 91 (W. Va. 2009) ("The evidence must be
such as ought to produce an opposite result at a second trial on the merits." (quoting State v.
Fraizer, 253 S.E.2d 534, 537 (W. Va. 1979))).
128 See Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure:Innocent Prisonersand Newly
Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 675 (2005).
129 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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and/or immediate release from custody when an inmate meets a
higher standard. Specifically, the District of Columbia provides for
a new trial when a petitioner shows that it is more likely than not
that he or she is actually innocent, and provides for vacating the
conviction and dismissing the relevant count with prejudice when
the movant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that he or
she is innocent.130
Similarly, Nebraska allows the court to vacate the conviction, set
aside the judgment, and order the person released from custody
when DNA evidence conclusively establishes innocence, and permits
a person to bring a motion for a new trial when newly discovered
DNA evidence does not establish innocence but has probative value
and could arguably meet the standard for a new trial that requires
a showing that the new evidence would probably have produced a
substantially different result.131
Utah also has similar provisions, permitting a new trial when the
petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome, and
vacation of the conviction with prejudice and expungement of the
record when a petitioner proves factual innocence with clear and
132
convincing evidence.
C. What ProceduralBars, If Any, Should Prevent an Individual
From Securing Relief?
1. Due Diligence
States are almost universal in their insistence that an individual
who has new evidence in his or her case must show diligence in
discovering that evidence. The states of Alabama, 133 Alaska, 134
Arizona, 135 Arkansas, 136 Colorado,13 7 Delaware, 138 Florida, 139

130

D.C. CODE § 22-4135(g)(2)-(3) (2016).

1.31

NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2101,

29-4118(2), 29-4123(2)-(3)

(2015); see also State v.

Buckman, 675 N.W.2d 372, 381-82 (Neb. 2004) (discussing the Nebraska
framework and when the court can vacate a judgment based on DNA results).

statutory

132 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-104(1)(e), (2), 78B-9-303(2)(b), 78B-9-404(1)(b) (LexisNexis

2015).
133 ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(e)(1) ("Newly discovered material facts exist which require that
the conviction or sentence be vacated from the court, because .. . [t]he facts relied upon were
not known by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel at the time of trial or sentencing or in
time to file a posttrial motion pursuant to Rule 24, or in time to be included in any previous
collateral proceeding and could not have been discovered by any of those times through the
exercise of reasonable diligence.").
134 ALAsKA STAT. § 12.72.020(b)(2) (2015) ("[A] court may hear a claim ... based on newly
discovered evidence if the applicant establishes due diligence in presenting the claim ....
").
135 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4231(5)(b) (2015) ("Newly discovered material facts exist if.
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5
Georgia, 14 ° Hawaii,14 1 Idaho, 142 Illinois,143 Indiana, 144 Iowa, 14
14
8
14
7
14
Maryland, 9
Louisiana,
Kentucky,
Kansas, 146

[t]he defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly discovered material facts.").
ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-112-201(a)(2) (2015) ("[A] person convicted of a crime may
commence a proceeding to secure relief... if the person claims under penalty of perjuiy that.
•.[t]he scientific predicate for the claim could not have been previously discovered through
the exercise of due diligence ....").
137 See Farrar v. People, 208 P.3d 702, 706 (Colo. 2009) ("[E]vidence will be considered
newly discovered for purposes of a motion for new trial only if it was both unknown to the
defendant and his counsel in time to be meaningfully confronted at trial and unknowable
through the exercise of due diligence.").
138 See Swan v. State, 28 A.3d 362, 387 (Del. 2011) ("To obtain a new trial . . . [the
defendant] must show . . .that the evidence was discovered since trial, and could not have
(citing Lloyd v. State, 534 A.2d 1262,
been discovered before trial with due diligence .
1267 (Del. 1987))).
139 See Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 916 (Fla. 1991) ("[N]ewly discovered ... facts 'must
have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it
must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known them by the use of
diligence."' (quoting Hallman v. State, 371 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 1979))).
140 See Timberlake v. State, 271 S.E.2d 792, 795 (Ga. 1980) ("It is incumbent on a party
who asks for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence to satisfy the court ...
that it was not owing to the want of due diligence that he did not acquire it sooner.
(quoting Emmett v. State, 205 S.E.2d 231, 235 (Ga. 1974))).
141 See State v. Mabuti, 807 P.2d 1264, 1268 (Haw. 1991) ("A motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence will only be granted if . . . such evidence could not have been
(quoting State v.
discovered before or at trial through the exercise of due diligence .
McNulty, 588 P.2d 438, 445 (Haw. 1978))).
142 See, e.g., State v. Drapeau, 551 P.2d 972, 978 (Idaho 1976) ("A motion based on newly
discovered evidence must disclose ... that failure to learn of the evidence was due to no lack
of diligence on the part of the defendant." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
143 See, e.g., People v. Morgan, 817 N.E.2d 524, 527-28 (Ill. 2004) (noting that "newly
discovered" evidence is evidence that was unavailable at the initial trial and which could not
have been discovered through diligence at an earlier time).
144 See, e.g., Kubsch v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1138, 1145 (Ind. 2010) (explaining that new
evidence allows for a new trial only if the defendant demonstrates that "due diligence" was
exercised in discovering the new evidence (quoting Taylor v. State 840 N.E.2d 324, 330 (Ind.
2006))).
145 See, e.g., Summage v. State, 579 N.W.2d 821, 822 (Iowa 1998) ("[Tjhe evidence could not
have been discovered earlier in the exercise of due diligence.").
146 See, e.g., State v. Cook, 135 P.3d 1147, 1166 (Kan. 2006) (demonstrating that the
defendant must establish that new evidence could not have been offered at trial with
"reasonable diligence" (citing State v. Norton, 85 P.3d 686, 689-90 (Kan. 2004))).
147 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 250 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Ky. 2008) ("Newly discovered
evidence is evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial through the
exercise of reasonable diligence." (citing Richardson v. Head, 236 S.W.3d 17, 22 (Ky. Ct. App.
2007))).
148 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 851(B)(3) (2016) ("The court, on motion of the
defendant, shall grant a new trial whenever . . . [n]ew and material evidence that,
notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the defendant, was not discovered
before or during the trial, is available, and if the evidence had been introduced at the trial it
would probably have changed the verdict or judgment of guilty.").
149 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PRO. § 8-301(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2015) ("A person charged by
indictment or criminal information with a crime ... may, at any time, file a petition for writ
of actual innocence ... if the person claims that there is newly discovered evidence that ...
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331.").
136
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Massachusetts, 150
Michigan, 151
Minnesota, 152
Mississippi, 53
154
155
156
Montana,
New Jersey,
New Mexico,
New York, 157 North
Carolina, 158 North Dakota,1 59 Oregon, 160 Rhode Island,1 61 South
1,o See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grace, 491 N.E.2d 246, 248 (Mass. 1986) ("Not only must
the allegedly new evidence demonstrate the materiality, weight, and significance that we
have described, but it must also have been unknown to the defendant or his counsel and not
reasonably discoverable by them at the time of trial (or at the time of the presentation of an
earlier motion for a new trial.) The defendant has the burden of proving that reasonable
pretrial diligence would not have uncovered the evidence." (citations omitted)).
151See, e.g., People v. Cress, 664 N.W.2d 174, 182 (Mich. 2003) ("For a new trial to be
granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show that. . . 'the party
could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial."'
(quoting People v. Johnson, 545 N.W.2d 637, 638 n.6 (Mich. 1996))).
152MINN. STAT. § 590.01(4)(b)(2) (2015) ("[A] court may hear a petition for postconviction
relief if... the petitioner alleges the existence of newly discovered evidence ... that could not
have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the petitioner or petitioner's
attorney within the two-year time period for filing a postconviction petition.").
153 See, e.g., Witherspoon v. State, 1999-CA-01146-COA ( 6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) ("In
order to warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it
must appear that the evidence . . .could not have been discovered before the trial by the
exercise of due diligence." (citing Moore v. State, 508 So. 2d 666, 668 (Miss. 1987))).
154 See, e.g., State v. Beach, 2013 MT 130,
10, 370 Mont. 163, 167, 302 P.3d 47, 52 ("The
failure to discover the evidence sooner must not be the result of a lack of diligence on the
defendant's part.").
155 See, e.g., State v. Nash, 58 A.3d 705, 723 (N.J. 2013) ("Evidence is newly discovered and
sufficient to warrant the grant of a new trial when it is . . . 'discovered since the trial and not
discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand."' (quoting State v. Carter, 426 A.2d 501, 508
(N.J. 1981))).
'56 See, e.g., Montoya v. Ulibarri, 2007-NMSC-035,
31, 142 N.M. 89, 99, 163 P.3d 476,
486 (holding that a defendant must be able to show that newly discovered evidence was not
able to be discovered through due diligence before trial).
157 See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97, 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (requiring that
claims for relief based on newly discovered evidence must establish that the evidence was not
discoverable before trial by the exercise of due diligence (citing People v. Marino, 951
N.Y.S.2d 740, 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012))); cf. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 108 ("[A]
constitutional violation occurs only if there is clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant is innocent." (citations omitted)).
158 See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 744 S.E.2d 153, 157 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) ("To prevail on a
motion for appropriate relief based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must establish
...that due diligence was used and proper means were employed to procure the testimony at
the trial." (quoting State v. Hall, 669 S.E.2d 30, 35 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008))).
159See, e.g., Tweed v. State, 2010 ND 38,
16, 779 N.W.2d 667, 675 ("To prevail on a
motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence under N.D.R. Crim. P. 33, 'the
defendant must show ...[that] the failure to learn about the evidence at the time of trial was
not the result of the defendant's lack of diligence." (quoting Moore v. State, 2007 ND 96, 9,
734 N.W.2d 336, 339)).
160See, e.g., State v. Arnold, 879 P.2d 1272, 1277 (Or. 1994) ("[E]vidence that may justify a
court in granting a new trial ... must be such as, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered before or during the trial; . . . [and] must be such that it cannot, with
reasonable diligence, be used during trial.").
161 See, e.g., Reise v. State, 913 A.2d 1052, 1056 (R.I. 2007) ("When conducting the analysis
of an application for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence . . . [t]he
[defendant], [as a] threshold .... must establish that . . .the evidence was not discoverable
prior to trial despite the exercise of due diligence; [and that] the evidence is not merely
cumulative or impeaching but rather is material to the issue upon which it is admissible."
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Carolina, 162 Texas, 163 Utah,16 4 Vermont, 165 Washington, 16 6 West
Virginia, 67 Wisconsin,168 Wyoming,1 6 9 and the District of
Columbia1 70 require some showing of diligence before an inmate
may obtain relief based upon a claim of new evidence.
However, in the post-conviction arena, the due diligence standard
is hard to apply.... Defendants lose their right to -an attorney after
their initial appeal so they are often left unrepresented, in a prison
cell, unable to conduct the investigation required to unearth new
evidence. 171 Should it be sufficient that they continually sought out
(citations omitted)).
162 See, e.g., Clark v. State, 434 S.E.2d 266, 267 (S.C. 1993) ("To obtain a new trial based
on after discovered evidence, the party must show that the evidence ... could not have been
discovered before trial.").
163 See, e.g., Lee v. State, 186 S.W.3d 649, 659-60 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) ("A defendant is
entitled to a new trial because of newly discovered evidence when the defendant shows ...
the movant's failure to discover or obtain the evidence was not due to a lack of diligence."
(quoting Keeler v. State, 74 S.W.3d 31, 36-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002))).
164 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-104(e)(i) (LexisNexis 2015) ("[N]either the petitioner nor
petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to
include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding,
and the evidence could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence.").
13, 190 Vt. 81, 85, 25 A.3d 553, 557 ("To
.165 See, e.g., State v. Charbonneau, 2011 VT 57,
succeed on a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant
must show: that 'the evidence is such ... that it could not have been discovered before the
trial by the exercise of due diligence; that it is material to the issue; and that it is not merely
14, 186 Vt. 583,
cumulative or impeaching."' (quoting State v. Charbonneau, 2009 VT 86,
586, 980 A.2d 279, 284)).
166 See, e.g., In re Pers. Restraint of Lord, 868 P.2d 835, 851 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) ("[T]he
defendant must show . . . 'that the evidence ...

could not have been discovered before trial by

the exercise of due diligence."' (quoting State v. Williams, 634 P.2d 868, 873 (Wash. 1981) (en
banc))).
167 See, e.g., State ex rel. Smith v. McBride, 681 S.E.2d 81, 91 (W. Va. 2009) ("It must
appear ... that [the defendant] was diligent in ascertaining and securing [the] evidence, and
that the new evidence is such that due diligence would not have secured it before the verdict."
(second and third alteration in original) (quoting In re Renewed Investigation of State Police
Crime Lab., Serology Div., 633 S.E.2d 762, 763 (W. Va. 2006))).
166 See, e.g., State v. Plude, 2008 WI 58,
32, 310 Wis. 2d 28, 49, 750 N.W.2d 42, 52 ("[T]he
defendant . . . [must] not [have been] negligent in seeking the evidence." (quoting State v.
McCallum, 561 N.W.2d 707, 710 (Wis. 1997))).
166 See, e.g., Opie v. State, 422 P.2d 84, 85 (Wyo. 1967) ("[I]t is incumbent on a party who
asks for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to satisfy the court ...that
[knowledge of the evidence] was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come
sooner." (citing United States v. Johnson, 142 F.2d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 1944))).
170 See, e.g., Payne v. United States, 697 A.2d 1229, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he party
seeking the new trial must show diligence in the attempt to procure the newly discovered
evidence." (quoting Heard v. United States, 245 A.2d 125, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1968))).
171 See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974); Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky,
ProsecutorialDiscretion and Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
467, 508-09 (2009) ("[C]onvicted defendants generally lack the resources to uncover new
evidence or to follow up effectively on their own."). It has been made clear that "[t]he duty of
the State ... is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal
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assistance while they were incarcerated? Does it even make sense
to have a due diligence standard? If new evidence comes to light,
should the court not consider it regardless of whether or not the
defendant had been diligent in seeking it out? Do we as a society
benefit when citizens are locked up due to them not showing due
diligence in seeking out new evidence? If due diligence is supposed
to protect the state's interest in having the ability to respond to new
evidence, shouldn't the burden be on the state to show prejudice
from the failure to present a timely claim of new evidence?
2. Time Frames and Sunset Provisions
New evidence can be discovered at any time. In the criminal
justice world, however, claims for new evidence are often cognizable
only through a motion for new trial, before the trial court loses
jurisdiction of the case and it is sent to direct appeal. 172 This means
that, in many states, newly discovered evidence is only cognizable
as a claim for a very short period of time after conviction but before
the imposition of a sentence, or within a few months after the
conviction and sentence. 173 Generally, statutes that impose time
restrictions on new evidence claims attempt to limit the number of
claims heard after the conviction, thus preserving the finality of
such convictions over their accuracy.174 For some states, once this
time period has passed, claims for relief based on newly discovered
evidence may no longer be available.1 75 These are some of the
common deadlines found in statutes across the country:

defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure ... an adequate
opportunity to present his claims fairly in the ... appellate process." Ross, 417 U.S. at 616.
172 See Paul Mogin, Using New Evidence of a Constitutional Violation to Get a New Trial,
CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 26, 28.
173 Compare N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.30(3) (McKinney 2015) (authorizing new evidence
as grounds for setting aside or modifying a verdict, if brought on motion after a verdict of
guilty and before sentencing), with TEX. R. APP. PROC. 21.4(a) (authorizing a thirty-day filing
period for a motion for new trial after sentencing).
174 See Medwed, supra note 128, at 690-91 ("[T]ime limits arguably promote finality ... by
pinpointing a date at which the parties know that any exposure stemming from the relevant
incident has ceased."); cf. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 112 (1946) (noting that,
while under the federal criminal appeals scheme, motions for new trials in light of new
evidence may be made for an "extraordinary length of time[;]" the resulting potential to delay
enforcement of sentences requires courts to keep a watchful eye for meritless appeals).
175 Medwed, supra note 128, at 690 (noting that time limitations present a significant
obstacle for the filing of new claims).
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a. Ten Days
Oregon provides just ten days after the entry of judgment to file a
motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence in non176
DNA cases.
b. 120 Days
Ohio provides for a window of just four months from the date 17of7
the verdict to file a claim for relief based on new evidence.
However, if the claim is based on DNA evidence, and if the
defendant can additionally establish "by clear and convincing proof'
that he or she could not have discovered the DNA results within the
120-day time period, he or she may file a claim after the four-month
period.178

c. One Year
Louisiana mandates that motions for new trial be filed within one
year of the verdict unless based on DNA evidence. 179 Even still,
motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence brought
within one year of conviction are subject to the lower "would

176 See OR. R. CIV. P. 64(F)(1) ("A motion to set aside a judgment and for a new trial, with
the affidavits or declarations, if any, in support thereof, shall be filed not later than 10 days
after the entry of the judgment sought to be set aside."); but see OR. REV. STAT. §§ 138.690,
138.696 (2016) (explaining that motions for DNA testing and grants of relief based on DNA
testing results are exempt from the established time limit in Rule 64 of the Oregon Rules of
Civil Procedure).
177 See OHIO R. CRIM. P. 33(B) ("Motions for new trial on account of newly discovered
evidence shall be filed within one hundred twenty days after the day upon which the verdict
was rendered, or . . . within seven days from an order of the court finding that he was
unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence within the one hundred twenty day
period.").
178 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.21(A)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2015) ("Any person who has been
convicted of a criminal offense . . . and who is an offender for whom DNA testing [] was
performed . . . and analyzed in the context of and upon consideration of all available
admissible evidence related to the person's case . . . provided results that establish, by clear
and convincing evidence, actual innocence of that felony offense ... may file a petition in the
court that imposed sentence, . . . asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or
sentence or to grant other appropriate relief."); see also id. § 2953.21(A)(1)(b) ('[A]ctual
innocence' means that ... no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of
the offense of which the petitioner was convicted.").
179 See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 853(B) (2016) ("When the motion for a new trial is
based on Article 851(B)(3) of this Code, the motion may be filed within one year after the
"); but see id. art. 930.8(A)(2) (noting that
verdict of judgment of the trial court ....
applications for post-conviction relief may be considered even if they are filed after more than
two years of the conviction and final sentencing, provided that the grounds for relief establish
a constitutional violation).
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probably have produced a different verdict standard,"1 80 while
motions brought later based on newly discovered DNA evidence
require "clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is
factually innocent."18 1 Additionally, the accused can present newly
discovered evidence if discovered after one year from conviction and
within two years of discovering the new facts, but only when that
newly discovered evidence supports a state or federal constitutional
claim.18 2 As discovered above and below, both Louisiana state
courts i8 3 and the U.S. Supreme Court have left open the question of
18 4
whether actual innocence is a freestanding constitutional claim.
In Tennessee, although motions for new trial must be filed within
i8 6
thirty days of the sentence,18 5 petitions for post-conviction relief
and petitions for writs of error coram nobis18 7 based on newly
discovered evidence may be filed within one year of when the
judgment becomes final.
d. Eighteen Months
Alaska provides for a window of eighteen months from the date of
the judgment,18 8 although a defendant may file a petition outside of
this window if the claim "was not known" within this time frame,
and if he or she "establishes due diligence in presenting the
claim."1 8 9

180 State v. Thomas, 48,530-KA, p. 8-9 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/4/13); 131 So. 3d 84, 89 (citing
State v. Watts, 2000-0602, p. 6 (La. 1/14/03); 835 So. 2d 441, 447; State v. Hammons, 597 So.
2d 990, 994 (La. 1992)).
181 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 930.3(7) (2016).
182 Id. arts. 853(B), 930.8(A), 930.3(1).
183 See, e.g., State v. Pierre, 2013-0873, p. 8 (La. 10/15/13); 125 So. 3d 403, 408.
184 See, e.g., Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71-72 (2009).
185 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 33(b).
186 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(a) (2015).
187 Id. § 27-7-103 (2015); see also State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 670 (Tenn. 1999) (holding
that the statute of limitations for a petition for writ of error coram nobis is one year from the
date the judgment becomes final in the trial court); Mills v. State, No. M2011-00620-CCAR3PC, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 996, at *60-61, *63, *71 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19,
2013) (granting coram nobis relief long after the conviction, based on new DNA evidence that
did not meet actual innocence standards, but met coram nobis standards).
188 ALASKA STAT. §12.72.020(a)(3)(A) (2015) (stating that claims of new evidence must be
raised within eighteen months of judgment or one year from when direct appeal is final);
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35.1(c).
189 ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.020(b)(2)(A).
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e. Two Years
Delaware imposes a strict time limit of two years from the date of
the judgment in the case to file a motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence. 190 However, a defendant can bring a
motion- for DNA -testing -within three years of the date of the
conviction,1 9 1 and can then bring a motion for a new trial following
favorable DNA results, provided those results establish "by clear
of fact . . . would
and convincing evidence that no reasonable trier
1 92
testing.
the
of
light
in
person"
the
convicted
have
Maine allows for motions for a new trial based on DNA results
within "[t]wo years after the date of conviction," or within two years
of the date that "new technology with respect to DNA analysis that
is capable of providing new material information" came into
193
existence.
New Mexico's statute sets a two-year time limit from the date of
the defendant's conviction to file a motion for a new trial based on
new evidence.1 94 Requests for relief past the two-year time limit
195
may be heard under a higher standard.
Wyoming's code requires newly discovered evidence claims to be
96
raised within two years of the final judgment in the case.
However, Wyoming's statute for post-conviction DNA testing states
that "[n]otwithstanding any law or rule of procedure that bars a
motion for a new trial as untimely, a convicted person197may use"
DNA test results as the basis for a motion for a new trial.
In Florida, motions for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence must be brought within two years of when the judgment
and sentence become final, 198 unless the defendant discovers new
evidence and can show due diligence in failing to present the claim
within the two-year time period. 99
190 DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 33 (stating motions for a new trial must be made prior to or

within two years of final judgment).
191 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(a) (2015).
192

Id. § 4504(b).

193 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 2137(2)(B), (C) (2015).

N.M. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 5-614(C).
30, 142 N.M. 89, 99, 163 P.3d 476,
195 See, e.g., Montoya v. Ulibarri, 2007-NMSC-035,
486 ("[Proofl by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted
him in light of the new evidence [is required]." (quoting Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202,
209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996))).
194

196 WYO. R. CRIM. P. 33(c).
197 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-303(b) (2015).
198 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(b).

199 Id. at 3.850(b)(1) ("[A] motion shall be filed or considered ...if filed more than 2 years
after the judgment . . . [if] the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the
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f. Three Years
In Mississippi, for non-DNA claims 200 a defendant must bring a
motion within three years of when the State Supreme Court rules
on the defendant's direct appeal, or within three years of when he or
she could have brought an appeal, or within three years of entry of a
judgment if there was a guilty plea. 201 DNA claims are exempted
20 2
from these time limits.
g. Five Years
Other than setting no time limits, Nebraska provides perhaps the
most lenient timeframe. Nebraska allows for motions for a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence to be filed within five years
after the date of the verdict, or later if based on DNA, or if the nonDNA evidence could not have been discovered within the five-year
window.203
h. No Time Limit
Only two states-New Jersey 204 and New York 205-explicitly state
that inmates may challenge their conviction "at any time" when the
challenge is based on newly discovered evidence. Other states have
no express time limit, implying those claims may be brought at any
time. However, as noted previously, most jurisdictions, even those
without time limits, require a showing of diligence. 20 6
Similar to due diligence, is society served by sunset provisions on
new evidence statutes and time limits for presenting new evidence?

movant or the movant's attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence, and the claim is made within 2 years of the time the new facts were or could have
been discovered with the exercise of due diligence[.]").
200 MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5(2) (2015).
201 Id. § 99-39-5(2).
202 Id. § 99-39-5(2)(a)(ii) (exempting claims based on DNA results from three-year statute
of limitations).
203 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2103(4) (2015) ("A motion for new trial ... shall be filed within a
reasonable time after the discovery of the new evidence and cannot be filed more than five
years after the date of the verdict, unless the motion and supporting documents show the new
evidence could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at trial and
such evidence is so substantial that a different result may have occurred."); see also id. §§ 294120(1), 29-4123(2) (2015) (noting that a motion to vacate a conviction and set aside judgment
has no time limits when based on DNA test results).
204 N.J. CT. R. 3:20-2 ("A motion for new trial based on the ground of newly-discovered
evidence may be made at any time ...").
205 N.Y. CRIM.PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(g) (McKinney 2015).
206 See, e.g., id.; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-303(d) (2015); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(b)(1).
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Of course it is a nice idea to have cases fully resolved, but if there is
new evidence and no prejudice to the prosecution by presenting it, it
does not make sense to have limits on the presentation of evidence.
The cost of incarceration continues to rise each year. 20 7 There may
be some financial benefits in restricting filings by inmates, but
these savings are dramatically -- overwhelmed by the -cost of
In addition, there is the moral question of
corrections. 20 8
incarcerating someone for a crime that new evidence can disprove.
And, of course, there are cases in which new evidence points to the
actual offender. 20 9 Society is certainly not served by restricting the
ability to bring that evidence to light by introducing false or
arbitrary time restrictions on evidence.
3. Other Requirements
Many states have additional requirements above and beyond
The most common
diligence or artificial sunset provisions.
requirements are that the new evidence must be material and must
not be merely cumulative to the evidence at trial or qualify as
Thirty states 210 and the District of
impeachment evidence.
207 See David Cole, Turning the Corneron Mass Incarceration?,9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.L. 27,
34-35 (2011).
208 See id. See also Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1555, 1624-25
(2003) (noting that inmate filings place a substantial burden on the court system every year,
which amounted to approximately $51 million dollars in 1995).
209 See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1182-83 (2010).
210 ALABAMA: ALA. R. CRIM.P. 32.1(e)(2)-(3) ("[Any defendant who has been convicted of a
criminal offense may institute a proceeding.., to secure appropriate relief on the ground that
...[niewly discovered material facts exist ... [that are] not merely cumulative to other facts
that were known[,] . . . [nor] merely amount to impeachment evidence."); ALASKA: ALASKA
STAT. § 12.72.020(b)(2)(B)-(C) (2015) (noting that the court may hear a claim based on newly
discovered evidence if the evidence is not cumulative to the evidence presented at trial nor
impeachment evidence); ARIZONA: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4231(5)(c) (2015) ("Newly
discovered material facts exist if . . . [t]he newly discovered material facts are not merely
cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence substantially
undermines testimony which was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence
probably would have changed the verdict or sentence."); COLORADO: Farrar v. People, 208
P.3d 702, 706-07 (Colo. 2009) ("[T]he newly discovered evidence must be of sufficient
consequence for reasons other than its ability to impeach, or cast doubt upon, the evidence
already presented at trial."); DELAWARE: Swan v. State, 28 A.3d 362, 387 (Del. 2011) ("To

obtain a new trial . . . [defendant] must show . . . the evidence is not merely cumulative or

(Ga. 1980)
impeaching."); GEORGIA: Timberlake v. State, 271 S.E.2d 792, 795-96
("[Defendant must establish that the evidence] 'is so material that it would probably produce
a different verdict[,] . . . that it is not cumulative only[,] . . . [and] a new trial will not be

granted if the only effect of the evidence will be to impeach the credit of a witness."'
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)); HAWAII: State v. Mabuti, 807 P.2d 1264, 1268
(Haw. 1991) (holding that only newly discovered evidence that is more material and not
simply cumulative or solely for impeachment will support motion for new trial (quoting State
v. McNulty, 588 P.2d 438, 445 (Haw. 1978))); IDAHO: State v. Drapeau, 551 P.2d 972, 978
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(Idaho 1976) ("A motion based on newly discovered evidence must disclose ...
that the
evidence is material, [and] not merely cumulative or impeaching."); IOWA: Summage v. State,
579 N.W.2d 821, 822 (Iowa 1998) (holding that postconviction relief is appropriate only when
the newly discovered evidence is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching (quoting
Jones v. Scurr, 316 N.W.2d 905, 907 (Iowa 1982))); MASSACHUSETTS: Commonwealth v.
Grace, 491 N.E.2d 246, 248 (Mass. 1986) ("The evidence said to be new not only must be
material and credible but also must carry a measure of strength in support of the defendant's
position. Thus newly discovered evidence that is cumulative of evidence admitted at trial
tends to carry less weight than new evidence that is different in kind." (citations omitted));
MICHIGAN: People v. Rao, 815 N.W.2d 105, 110 (Mich. 2012) (stating that a claim of newly
discovered evidence provides grounds for relief only if the evidence was not cumulative
(quoting People v. Cress, 664 N.W.2d 174, 182 (Mich. 2003))); MINNESOTA: MINN. STAT. §
590.01(4)(b)(2) (2015) ("[A] court may hear a petition for postconviction relief if . . . the
evidence is not cumulative to evidence presented at trial, [and] is not for impeachment
purposes."); MISSISSIPPI: Witherspoon v. State, 1999-CA-01146-COA (1 6) (Miss. Ct. App.
2000) (citing Moore v. State, 508 So. 2d 666, 668 (Miss. 1987)); MONTANA: State v. Beach,
2013 MT 130,
10, 370 Mont. 163, 167, 302 P.3d 47, 52 ("[T]o determine whether 'newly
discovered evidence' warrant[s] a new trial[,] . . . '[t]he evidence must be material to the
issues at trial; [and] . . . be neither cumulative nor merely impeaching."' (quoting Beach v.
State, 2009 MT 398, 738, 353 Mont. 411, 419, 220 P.3d 667, 673)); NEW HAMPSHIRE: State v.
Etienne, 35 A.3d 523, 554 (N.H. 2011) (holding that to prevail on a motion for new trial,
defendant must prove the new evidence is not cumulative, but is on the merits and material
(quoting State v. Cossette, 856 A.2d 732, 737 (N.H. 2004))); NEW JERSEY: State v. Nash, 58
A.3d 705, 723 (N.J. 2013) ("Evidence is newly discovered and sufficient to warrant the grant
of a new trial when it is . . . 'material to the issue and not merely cumulative or impeaching or
contradictory."' (quoting State v. Carter, 426 A.2d 501, 508 (N.J. 1981))); NEW MEXICO:
Montoya v. Ulibarri, 2007-NMSC-035,
31, 142 N.M. 89, 99, 163 P.3d 476, 486 ("Under the
motion for [a] new trial standard, a defendant must show that the evidence ... [is] not merely
cumulative; and . . . it must not be merely impeaching or contradictory." (quoting State v.
Garcia, 2005-NMSC-038,
8, 138 N.M. 659, 661, 125 P.3d 638, 640)); NEW YORK: People v.
Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97, 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (holding that claims for relief based on
newly discovered evidence must establish that the e'idence is "material to the issue," and not
impeaching or contradictory); NORTH CAROLINA: State v. Peterson, 744 S.E.2d 153, 157 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2013) ("To prevail on a motion for appropriate relief based on newly discovered
evidence, a defendant must establish . . . that [the new evidence] is competent, material and
relevant, . . . that the newly discovered evidence is not merely cumulative, [and] that it does
not tend only to contradict a former witness or to impeach or discredit him." (quoting State v.
Hall, 669 S.E.2d 30, 35 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008))); NORTH DAKOTA: Tweed v. State, 2010 ND 38,
16, 779 N.W.2d 667, 675 ("A district court may grant post-conviction relief when . . . 'the
newly discovered evidence is material to the issues at trial."' (quoting Moore v. State, 2007
ND 96,
9, 734 N.W.2d 336, 339 (N.D. 2007))); OREGON: State v. Arnold, 879 P.2d 1272,
1277 (Or. 1994) ("[E]vidence that may justify a court in granting a new trial must ... be
material to an issue[,] . . . not be merely cumulative[, and] . . . not be merely impeaching or
contradicting of former evidence."); RHODE ISLAND: Reise v. State, 913 A.2d 1052, 1056 (R.I.
2007) (holding that the threshold issue in determining whether an application for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence may be considered is whether the
evidence is cumulative, impeaching, or material to the issue (citing Bleau v. Wall, 808 A.2d
637, 642 (R.I. 2002))); SOUTH CAROLINA: Clark v. State, 434 S.E.2d 266, 267 (S.C. 1993)
(stating that a new trial based on "after discovered evidence" requires a showing that the
evidence is material to a claim of actual guilt or innocence, and does more than merely
impeach (citing Hayden v. State, 299 S.E.2d 854, 855 (S.C. 1983))); TEXAS: Lee v. State, 186
S.W.3d 649, 659-60 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) ("A defendant is entitled to a new trial because of
newly discovered evidence when the defendant shows . . . the new evidence is admissible and
is not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching." (quoting Keeter v. State,
74 S.W.3d 31, 36-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002))); UTAH: UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-104(1)(e)(ii)(iii) (LexisNexis 2015) ("[N]ewly discovered material evidence ... that requires the court to
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Columbia 2 n have these additional requirements.
Requiring new evidence to be material does not seem to be much
of a burden. If the evidence is not material, then it certainly would
not be sufficient-under any of the new evidence standards-to lead
to a reversal. The cumulative requirement, however, can be
problematic. For- example, if-what the defense presented at -trial
was that the defendant had an alibi for the crime, that alibi might
be rejected by the jury because the jury did not find the alibi
witness credible (for example, a known gang member and/or
If, after trial, a new alibi
someone with a criminal record).
witness-one with an unassailable and unimpeachable background,
and one with no motive to lie comes forward to corroborate the alibi
evidence at trial, is that cumulative evidence? It is very difficult to
assess the reasons juries reject evidence; therefore, courts should be
very lenient in how they apply this standard. But what exactly does
"merely" cumulative really mean?
It is very much open to
interpretation.

vacate [a] conviction or sentence . . . [must demonstrate that] the material evidence is not
merely cumulative of evidence that was known[,] . . . [nor is it] impeachment evidence.");
13, 190 Vt. 81, 85, 25 A.3d 553, 557 ("To
VERMONT: State v. Charbonneau, 2011 VT 57,
succeed on a motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must
show . . . 'that it is material to the issue[,] and that it is not merely cumulative or
impeaching."' (quoting State v. Charbonneau, 2009 VT 86, 14, 186 Vt. 583, 980 A.2d 279));
WASHINGTON: In re Pers. Restraint of Lord, 868 P.2d 835, 851 (Wash. 1994) (en banc)
(holding that newly discovered evidence provides a basis for relief if the evidence is more than
cumulative or impeaching (quoting State v. Williams, 634 P.2d 868, 873 (Wash. 1981))); WEST
VIRGINIA: State ex rel. Smith v. McBride, 681 S.E.2d 81, 91-92 (W. Va. 2009) ("[I]n order to
obtain a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.. . '[s]uch evidence must be new and
material, and not merely cumulative[,] and cumulative evidence is additional evidence of the
same kind to the same point."' (quoting State v. Frazier, 253 S.E.2d 534, 573 (W. Va. 1979)));
WISCONSIN: State v. Plude, 2008 WI 58, 32, 310 Wis. 2d 28, 48, 750 N.W.2d 42, 52 ("When
moving for a new trial based on the allegation of newly-discovered evidence, a defendant must
prove . . . 'the evidence is material to an issue in the case[,] and ...

not merely cumulative."'

(quoting State v. McCallum, 561 N.W.2d 707, 710-11 (Wis. 1997))); WYOMING: Opie v. State,
422 P.2d 84, 85 (Wyo. 1967) ("[T]he general rule [is] that it is incumbent on a party who asks
for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to satisfy the court ... that it is so
material that it would probably produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted[,]
and that it is not ... speaking to facts in relation to which there was evidence at the trial."
(citing United States v. Johnson, 142 F.2d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 1944))).
211 See Payne v. United States, 697 A.2d 1229, 1234 (D.C. 1997) (stating that the burden
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is on the petitioner to establish under a
five-prong test that the evidence being offered is not merely cumulative or impeaching, but is
material to the merits of an issue (quoting Heard v. United States, 245 A.2d 125, 126 (D.C.
1968))).
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D. Should Actual Innocence Claims Be Treated Differently from
Newly Discovered Evidence Claims?
In many states, such as Alaska, California, Connecticut, Illinois,
Minnesota, Texas, and others, "post-conviction newly discovered
evidence" claims are currently the same as "actual innocence"
claims. Courts and litigators often refer to them by either name.
Other states have either not recognized a freestanding claim of
actual innocence, or, like the U.S. Supreme Court, have not resolved
whether actual innocence is a freestanding claim. 212 For instance,
Florida, which provides for a new trial when "newly discovered
evidence . . . [is] of such nature that it would probably produce an
acquittal on retrial,"2 13 has not recognized a freestanding actual
214
innocence claim.
Louisiana courts have recognized actual innocence claims based
on DNA evidence, but have not resolved whether there is a
freestanding actual innocence claim not based on DNA evidence
215
that is cognizable in state post-conviction proceedings.
Other states, such as California, 216 Connecticut, 217 Illinois, 21 New
Mexico, 21 9 and New York, 220 have explicitly recognized the right to a
freestanding claim of actual innocence, but some treat actual
innocence claims differently from newly discovered evidence claims.
For instance, in New Mexico, one may present a motion for new
trial based on newly discovered evidence within two years of
judgment, and the court may grant relief where the new evidence
"will probably change the result if a new trial is granted." 22 1 After
Leventhal, supra note 65, at app.; see supranotes 52-53 and accompanying text.
213 Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991).
214 Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1088-89 (Fla. 2008).
215 See State v. Pierre, 2013-0873, p. 8 (La. 10/15/13); 125 So. 3d 403, 408.
216 In re Lawley, 179 P.3d 891, 897 (Cal. 2008) ("We have long recognized the viability of
an actual innocence habeas corpus claim, at least insofar as the claim is based on newly
discovered evidence.").
217 Gould v. Comm'r of Corr., 22 A.3d 1196, 1204 (Conn. 2011) ("With respect to the correct
standard, Miller unequivocally and unmistakably set forth a two part test for obtaining
habeas relief on the basis of a freestanding claim of actual innocence." (citing Miller v.
Comm'r of Corr., 700 A.2d 1108, 1130-31 (Conn. 1997))).
218 In People v. Ortiz, the court held that "[t]he due process clause of the Illinois
Constitution affords postconviction petitioners the right to assert a freestanding claim of
actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence." People v. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941, 94950 (Ill. 2009) (citing People v. Morgan, 817 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ill. 2004); People v. Washington,
665 N.E.2d 1330, 1336-37 (Ill. 1996)).
219 Montoya v. Ulibarri, 2007-NMSC-035,
29-30, 142 N.M. 89, 99 163 P.3d 476, 486.
220 People v. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
221 Montoya, 2007-NMSC-035,
29, 142 N.M. at 99, 163 P.3d at 486 (quoting State v.
Garcia, 2005-NMSC-038,
8, 138 N.M. 659, 661, 125 P.3d 638, 640); see also N.M. STAT. ANN.
212
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two years, however, a petitioner may bring a freestanding claim of
actual innocence based on the Due Process Clause of New Mexico's
Constitution, but must show "by clear and convincing evidence that
no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new
evidence."222

New -York does--not- impose- a time-limit on- newly- discovered
evidence claims subject to a "will probably change the result of a
new trial standard," but does impose other procedural
requirements, such as the evidence must be discovered after the
trial, be material, not cumulative, and does not merely impeach or
contradict the trial evidence. 223 However, New York case law has
also recognized a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on
the New York Constitution's Due Process Clause and prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, and that freestanding
innocence claims are not subject to the procedural restrictions
imposed on newly discovered evidence claims, but that they are
subject to a higher standard--clear and convincing evidence of
224
innocence.
As discussed above, Utah provides for both newly discovered
evidence claims and actual innocence claims, but with different
standards and different relief for each-a newly discovered evidence
claim and a showing of a reasonable likelihood of a different
outcome entitles one to a new trial, whereas an actual innocence
claim in which one proves innocence by clear and convincing
vacated with prejudice
evidence entitles one to have the conviction
225
expunged.
record
one's
have
to
and
Given that the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that a showing
of actual innocence-a showing that it is more likely than not that
no reasonable juror would convict-entitles state petitioners to have
226
their otherwise procedurally barred constitutional claims heard,
it makes sense that states should follow New York's model and not
impose any procedural restrictions on freestanding claims of actual
innocence.

§ 5-614(C) (2015).
1, 30, 138 N.M. at 91, 99, 163 P.2d at 484, 478, 486 (citing
222 Montoya, 2007-NMSC-035,
Exparte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
223 Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
224 Id. at 107-08.
225 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-104(i)(e)(iv), (3); supra note 76 and accompanying text.
226 Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326-27 (1995). When constitutional claims are subject to
"a procedural bar" such as timeliness or successive or abusive petitions, a federal court can
consider those otherwise barred constitutional claims on the merits if a petitioner makes a
sufficient showing of "actual innocence." See id.
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E. How May a New Evidence Claim Be Presented?
As noted previously, newly discovered evidence is often
considered cognizable only in a motion for a new trial, with time
limits in place based on traditional motions for a new trial, which
are necessarily tied to the jurisdiction of the trial court in the
original conviction. 227 However, for a number of reasons claims of
new evidence should more appropriately be made via a petition for
writ of habeas corpus.
First, the grounds for a new evidence claim may be discovered at
any time, and are not necessarily tied in any way to the timeframes
found in motions for a new trial.228 New evidence may take years to
develop, even decades, after the conviction has become final. 229 The
reason motions for a new trial are heard semi-contemporaneously to
the judgment of conviction is because the trial court still has
jurisdiction over the case, but this does not mean newly discovered
evidence will suddenly present itself during that time period.2 3 0
Second, new evidence claims rarely stand alone. Evidence which
is discovered after the case is over may give rise to other claims,
such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or a Brady
violation; thus, it makes sense for courts to hear all of these claims
in one petition in order to determine whether the conviction should
be reversed. 231
Finally, new evidence claims necessarily
contemplate facts outside the record, and no matter the standard,
these new facts must be weighed against the evidence developed at
trial.232 The habeas process also deals with facts outside the record
of the case, and a judge's role when determining habeas is to
determine whether those new facts justify relief when compared to
the evidence developed at trial. 233
IV. CALFORNIA'S NEW EVIDENCE STANDARD IS SO HIGH THAT IT
VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides

See Mogin, supra note 172, at 28.
See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway of Innocence for DeathSentenced PrisonersLeads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 965-66 (1994).
229 See id.
230 See State v. Lee Lim, 7 P.2d 825, 834 (Utah 1932) (Straup, J., dissenting).
231 See, e.g., McKenzie v. United States, No. 12-CV-3221 (KAM), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
148558, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2015).
232 Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 916 (Fla. 1991).
223 See State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Mo. 2003).
227
228
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protection against state actions that violate "fundamental
fairness. '234 While criminal procedures and applications of burdens
of proof are generally left to the states, "the State's power to
regulate procedural burdens [is] subject to proscription under the
Due Process Clause if it 'offends some principle of justice so rooted
in -the -traditions- and conscience -of-our people as to be -ranked as
235
fundamental."'
A. The Use of a Heightened Standardfor Relief Based on Newly
Discovered Evidence While There is Near-Uniform Application of a
Standard More Protective of Individual Rights in Other States
Violates FundamentalFairness and the Due Process Clause
The United States Supreme Court has explained that "widely
shared practice" is one of the "concrete indicators of what
"The nearfundamental fairness and rationality require." 236
uniform application" of a burden of proof can show that use of a
"heightened standard offends a principle of justice that is deeply
237
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people."
In Cooper v. Oklahoma, Oklahoma was one of only four states
that required criminal defendants prove by clear and convincing
evidence that they are incompetent, whereas forty-six states and
the federal courts required defendants prove incompetence by a
preponderance of the evidence at most. 238

Some "[s]tates place no

burden on the defendant at all, but rather require the prosecutor to
prove the defendant's competence .

.

'239
competency has been credibly raised.

.

once a question about

234 See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992) ("Discerning no historical basis
for concluding that the allocation of the burden of proving incompetence to the defendant
violates due process, we turn to consider whether the rule transgresses any recognized
principle of 'fundamental fairness' in operation" (quoting Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352)); Dowling
v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990) ("[W]hether the introduction of this type of
evidence is so extremely unfair that its admission violates 'fundamental conceptions of
justice."' (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977))). In Lovasco, the Court
stated that its task was to determine whether the complained of action "violates those
'fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions,'
and which define 'the community's sense of fair play and decency."' Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790
(first quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935); then quoting Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)).
235 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 367 (1996) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 201-02 (1977)).
236 Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 640 (1991).
237 Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362 (quoting Medina, 505 U.S. at 445).
238 See Cooper, 517 U.S. at 360-62.

239 Id. at 361-62.
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Specifically, in Cooper, the Court said: "The near-uniform
application of a standard that is more protective of the defendant's
rights than Oklahoma's clear and convincing evidence rule supports
our conclusion that the heightened standard offends a principle of
justice that is deeply 'rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people. "'240
Thus for instance, California, which is the only state that requires
that newly discovered evidence "must undermine the entire
prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence" with evidence
no "reasonable jury could ...

reject[,"

24 1

is violating due process by

employing a heightened standard when there is near-uniform
application of standards that are more protective of individual
242
rights in other states.
As discussed above, every other state's standard for habeas relief
based upon newly discovered evidence is substantially lower than
California's. The vast majority of the states require at most that a
petitioner show that it is more likely than not that the newly
discovered evidence would have changed the outcome of the original
trial or would do so at a new trial (i.e., proof by a preponderance of
243
the evidence).
While a minority of states require that the newly discovered
evidence proves innocence by clear and convincing evidence, 244 that
standard remains significantly lower than California's, which
appears to require at least proof of innocence beyond a reasonable
doubt by requiring that one "unerringly" prove innocence with
evidence no "reasonable jury could . . .reject[]. '' 245

Indeed, Texas,

which requires that an applicant with newly discovered evidence
unquestionably establish innocence, has explained that applicants
meet that burden when they demonstrate "by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted. '246 The
standard focuses the court's attention on whether there remains
substantial evidence of guilt, as opposed to whether an inmate is
able to conclusively establish innocence with affirmative evidence of
247
such, as currently required in California.
Id. at 362 (quoting Medina, 505 U.S. at 445).
In re Lawley, 179 P.3d 891, 898 (Cal. 2008) (citations omitted).
242 See supranotes 236-40 and accompanying text.
243 See discussion supra Part III.2.B.
244 See discussion supra Part III.2.C.
245 In re Lawley, 179 P.3d at 898 (citations omitted).
246 Ex parte Thompson, 153 S.W.3d 416, 417, 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Ex parte
Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
247 See Exparte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 206, 209.
240
241
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In fact, several states have considered and expressly rejected
heightened standards of proof comparable to California's "points
unerringly to innocence" standard as unjust because they are nearly
impossible to meet. In Jones v. State, the Florida Supreme Court
overruled a standard that required a petitioner to show that newly
prevented"
-would-, have
discovered - evidence -"conclusively
248 The court held that this "conclusiveness test" (like
conviction.
to
California's "unerringly" test) was too high, almost impossible
249
meet, and "r[an] the risk of thwarting justice in a given case."
Similarly, in Marble v. State,250 the Supreme Court of Montana
recently rejected a standard requiring a petitioner to "affirmatively
and unquestionably establish his innocence" with new evidence as
too rigid and extraordinarily high. 25 1 The Marble court reasoned
that a standard requiring a petitioner to "unquestionably establish
his innocence" was illogical and inconsistent with Montana's
statutory framework for post-conviction relief, which, like
California's, provides for relief in the form of an order for additional
briefing, further discovery, or a new trial (as opposed to an acquittal
252
or dismissal of charges with prejudice).
In Montoya v. Ulibarri, the Supreme Court of New Mexico
declined to follow California's standard for post-conviction relief
based on newly discovered evidence, which it held to impose "a
heavy burden on petitioners." 253 While, like California, the New
Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991) (citations omitted).
Id. (adopting instead a standard that newly discovered evidence should more likely
than not result in an acquittal on retrial).
250 Marble v. State, 2015 MT 242, 380 Mont. 366, 355 P.3d 742.
32, 380 Mont. at 376, 355 P.3d at 748-49.
251 Id. at
252 See id. There are states that provide for dismissal of charges with prejudice and/or
immediate release from prison upon meeting a higher standard. For example, the District of
Columbia provides for a new trial when a petitioner shows that it is more likely than not that
he or she is actually innocent, and also provides for vacating the conviction and dismissing
the relevant count with prejudice when the movant establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that he or she is innocent. D.C. CODE § 22-4135(g)(2)-(3) (2016). Similarly,
Nebraska allows the court to vacate the conviction, set aside the judgment, and order the
person released from custody when DNA evidence conclusively establishes innocence, and
permits a person to bring a motion for a new trial when newly discovered DNA evidence does
not establish innocence but has probative value and could arguably meet the standard for a
new trial that requires a showing that the new evidence would probably have produced a
substantially different result. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2101, 29-4118(2), 29-4123 (2015). Utah
also has similar provisions, permitting a new trial when the petitioner shows a reasonable
likelihood of a different outcome, and vacation of the conviction with prejudice and
expungement of the record when a petitioner proves factual innocence with clear and
convincing evidence. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-104(1)(e), (2), 78B-9-303(2)(b), 78B-9-404
(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2015).
253 Montoya v. Ulibarri, 2007-NMSC-035,
26, 142 N.M. 89, 98, 163 P.3d 476, 48 (quoting
In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 739 (Cal. 1993)). The court instead decided to adopt a "clear and
248

249
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Mexico Supreme Court believed the standard for post-conviction
relief should be higher than that on a motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence, the court held that the burden "should
not be so insurmountable that it is practically impossible for a
petitioner to prove his innocence." 2 54 The New Mexico Supreme
Court agreed with the Texas Supreme Court, which observed in
Elizondo that a standard requiring a petitioner to prove his
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt was a theoretical impossibility
"because exculpatory evidence can never outweigh inculpatory
255
evidence under this standard of sufficiency."
California's use of a significantly heightened standard-despite
the fact that there is uniform application of a standard of proof
more protective of individual rights in every other state-violates
fundamental fairness and the Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, Section 7 of California's
Constitution. 25 6 Further, it supports the additional evidence that
California's use of a heightened standard violates a principle of
justice that is deeply rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people.
B. As Evidenced by Balancingthe Risk of Error,the Individual
Interest, and the Government Interest, Employing a Heightened
Standardfor Newly Discovered Evidence Claims Violates Due
Process
United States Supreme Court precedent confirms that due
process must be flexible to protect the innocent and "minimiz[e] the
risk of error."257 Due process, "unlike some legal rules, is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances. 2 58
The Court has explained that this
"flexibility is necessary to gear the process to the particular need;
the quantum and quality of the process due in a particular situation
depend[s] upon the need to serve the purpose of minimizing the risk
convincing evidence" standard. Montoya, 2007-NMSC-035, at 30, 142 N.M. at 99, 163 P.3d
at 486 (citing Exparte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
254 Montoya, 2007-NMSC-035 at
29, 142 N.M. at 99, 163 P.3d at 486 (quoting State v.
Garcia, 2005-NMSC-038, 8, 138 N.M. 659, 661, 125 P.3d 638, 640).
255 Montoya, 2007-NMSC-035 at
29, 142 N.M. at 99, 163 P.3d at 486 (quoting Elizondo,
947 S.W.2d at 205).
256 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
257 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (citing
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
258 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
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of error. 259 Accordingly:
[T]he specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures: used, - and -the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would
260
entail.
In addition, the Court has said:
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is
embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of
factfinding, is to 'instruct the factfinder concerning the
degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication.' The standard serves to allocate the risk of
error between the litigants and to indicate the relative
26 1
importance attached to the ultimate decision.
Therefore, "[t]he 'more stringent the 'burden of proof a party must
bear. the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous
26 2
decision."'
Our society has long since determined that the factfinder should
have a high degree of confidence in the correctness of criminal
convictions and "our society has willingly chosen to bear a
substantial burden in order to protect the innocent." 263 "The heavy
standard applied in criminal cases manifests our concern that the
risk of error to the individual must be minimized even at the risk
that some who are guilty might go free." 26 4 "Indeed, concern about
the injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person
265
has long been at the core of our criminal justice system.

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
262 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 362 (1996) (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990)).
263 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977).
264 Addington, 441 U.S. at 428 (citing Patterson,432 U.S. at 208).
265 Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995); see also In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL
3385081, at *41 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010) ("If there is a principle more firmly embedded in the
fabric of the American legal system than that which proscribes punishment of the innocent, it
259
260
261
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In Cooper v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court also held that
Oklahoma's use of a heightened standard for determining
competency-one that required clear and convincing evidence as
opposed to a preponderance of the evidence-violated due process
because it "imposes a significant risk of an erroneous determination
"266

Any standard that requires affirmative proof of innocence imposes
too great of a risk of error on the individual. Our criminal justice
system is guided by the "fundamental" understanding that fairness
and justice can only be achieved if innocence must be presumed
unless guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 267 As clinical
professor and former Innocence Network President Keith Findley
argues in discussing "clear proof of innocence[:]" "to demand
certainty [of innocence] is to demand the impossible,... [but] in the
end, the best we can or should do is rely on the legal standards that
define guilt and, absent proof of guilt, presume innocence." 268
California's standard for newly discovered evidence in particular,
which requires that inmates "point unerringly to innocence" with
evidence no "reasonable jury could . . . reject[]," 269 places the entire
risk of error on the individual. 270 Further, it fails to recall the
understanding upon which the criminal justice system was builtthat even the most innocent person cannot always affirmatively
prove innocence.2 7 1 The United States Supreme Court has held that
"[i]t is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted
by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent
men are being condemned."272 Yet California's standard does just
that.
As one California Supreme Court Justice explained in criticizing
this standard:

is unknown to this Court.").
266 Cooper, 517 U.S. at 363, 369.
267 See Findley, supra note 209, at 1191.
268 Id. at 1162, 1190. Professor Findley goes on to state that "[a]nything less than that
[presumption] invites endless controversy about subjective assessments of guilt and
innocence, unwarranted insult and injury to the innocent who are forced to live under a
continuing cloud of suspicion, and erosion of some of our most fundamental constitutional
principles." Id. at 1162.
269 In re Lawley, 179 P.3d 891, 898 (Cal. 2008) (quoting In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 761 n.33
(Cal. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
270 Id. at 898.
271 See Findley, supra note 209, at 1200; see also S.B. 694, 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015)
(lowering the standard for habeas corpus relief in California).
272 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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The requirement of the majority that the petitioner prove his
innocence, either by establishing an alibi or by identifying
the perpetrator of the crime, is unreasonable and
unwarranted. A perfectly innocent person may be unable to
prove an alibi. And it is preposterous to demand of the
. accused that he place his finger upon the real-culprit in order
to exculpate himself. Although Billings has presented an
alibi, it is unnecessary for us to consider it. When the chain
27 3
of proof is destroyed, he needs none.
Thus, given the real danger that affirmative evidence of innocence
may be lacking even for the factually innocent, states should not
ask for anything further to prove innocence when new evidence
destroys the evidence of guilt; instead, courts must presume
innocence in the absence of adequate proof of guilt.
There can be no greater risk of error in our justice system than
that an innocent person is wrongfully convicted, or that an innocent
person with new evidence that shows that he or she was wrongfully
convicted is denied relief and forced to remain in prison or even face
execution.
Further, the weighing of the individual's interests versus the
state's interests also demonstrates that heightened standards for
newly discovered evidence claims violate due process. While any
post-conviction claim raises the specter of concerns regarding
judicial economy, floodgates, and finality, the individual liberty
in
interests retained by the innocent overcome society's interests 274
"finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources."
Thus, "the principles of comity and finality . . . must yield to the
275
imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATION AND A PROPOSAL FOR A

NEW MODEL
A. Legislative Considerationsand Recommendations
Clearly the authors are highly critical of California's new
evidence standard. Each of them has had claims of their innocent
clients rejected, fully knowing that those cases would have been
successful in other states with lower standards. It is heartbreaking
In re Billings, 298 P. 1071, 1119 (Cal. 1930) (Langdon, J., dissenting).
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-25 (1995).
275 Id. at 320-21 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 495 (1986)).
273
274
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knowing that the clients will likely die in prison having lost their
final chance at freedom.
Based on the discussion in this article the authors propose that
new evidence statutes recognize the legal, social, and moral
importance of allowing inmates to present evidence of their
innocence, undermine evidence of their guilt, and ultimately seek
their freedom. The authors also recognize that the courts must be
able to screen out non-meritorious claims and not re-litigate every
criminal case in the habeas process.
Based on these
counterbalancing interests, new evidence statutes should:
1. Not be limited to DNA evidence. There is no reason that one
area of science is signaled out as the sole basis for a new evidence
claim. There are other sciences that present compelling new
evidence, as well as witness testimony that can sometimes destroy a
criminal conviction. For example, long before DNA evidence there
was compelling post-conviction evidence, as in the tragic case of
William Jackson Marion, hanged for the murder of a man who was
276
later found alive.
2. Allow for relief where there is a "reasonable probability of a
different result in light of the new evidence;" or, at the most, allow
for relief where it is more likely than not the defendant would not
be convicted on retrial in light of the new evidence.
The
fundamental question should be whether the defendant would have
been convicted if the trial court had been aware of the evidence.
Any higher standard keeps people in prison who never should have
been there in the first place. That does not serve society or the
individual.
However, as noted previously, the "reasonable
probability" standard is often seen as too low for claims based solely
on newly discovered evidence, as this standard is used when the
trial was constitutionally defective in some way. 277 In this event,
the standard should, at the most, allow for relief where it is more
likely than not that the defendant would not be convicted on retrial
in light of the new evidence. This, indeed, is the standard proposed
by the authors of the California state legislation in 2015.278

276 See Bill Kelly, 1887 Hanging Remains Nebraska's Most Controversial Execution, NET
NEB. (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.netnebraska.org/article/news/1887-hanging-remainsnebraskas-most-controversial-execution.
277 See supra Part III.2.A.
278 S.B. 694, 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) ("A writ of habeus corpus may be prosecuted

for, but not limited to, . . . new evidence . . . that is credible, material, presented without
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3. Not include due diligence, time limits, or sunset provisions. It is
typically impossible for inmates to launch their own investigation
into new evidence.2 7 9 They sit in their cells and desperately seek
help. It is difficult for a court to assess whether the inmate has
exercised due diligence based on the restrictions; and as a practical
matter, it-makes-very-little sense- as arequirement. Inmates do not
sit on evidence that could prove their innocence. Society and the
individual are not served by rules that restrict the introduction of
evidence that can establish innocence and lead to the release of an
Similarly, society and the individual are not served
inmate.
because the evidence came to the court "late" under time limits and
These are heavy-handed methods to limit
sunset provisions.
litigation and they do so at far too great an expense.
4. Not include other requirements that the evidence be material,
These other
cumulative, and not merely for impeachment.
requirements, so common in statutes across the country, serve very
little purpose but to deny relief for those cases that meet the
standard in all other respects. For example, take a case where new
evidence shows the sole prosecution witness lied when she identified
the defendant. If that new evidence shows that it is more likely
than not the defendant would never have been convicted had the
evidence been available at the time of trial, why would we not want
the conviction to be reversed? There are exceptions to every rule,
and society is not served by keeping innocent people in prison on
technicalities.
B. Proposed Model Legislation Addressing New Evidence
In conclusion, the authors propose the following legislation:
(1) Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or
her liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas
corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or
restraint.
(2) A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited
to, the following reasons:

substantialdelay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not
changed the outcome at trial.").
279 E.g., Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed
Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 51 (2002) ('The
inmate is confined, unable to investigate, and often without training in the law or mental
ability to comprehend the requirements of [habeas law]." (alteration in original)).
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(a) New evidence exists that would more likely than not have
changed the outcome at trial/would change the outcome on retrial.
(3) Claims based on newly discovered evidence may be presented
at any time after the conviction, regardless of when the evidence is
discovered.

